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Section 1: Overview of the literature on migration and 
remittances  
“We are only beginning to learn how to make migration work more consistently for 
development. Each of us holds a piece of the migration puzzle, but none has the whole 
picture. It is time to start putting it together.” 
- Kofi Annan, Previous UN Secretary General at High Level Dialogue  
on International Migration and Development.  
 
“We reasonably think that an important piece of this puzzle is migrants’ remittances” 
         - Salomone, 2006 
Introduction 
Remittances have been broadly termed by the International Organization of 
Migration (IOM) as “monetary transfers that a migrant makes to the country of origin” 
(Barua, 2006). These are usually private transfers of money from migrants back to their 
family living in the country of origin. However, remittances can also be funds that are 
invested, deposited or donated by the migrant to the home country. As migration 
becomes more and more widespread in a steadily globalizing world and as money 
transfer channels become more efficient, more migrants are sending back money to their 
home countries causing a remarkable rise in remittance flows.  In addition to the sheer 
size of remittance flows, it is also notable that the bulk of these financial flows are 
received by developing countries.  
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In 2008, remittance flowing into developing countries amounted to $338 billion 
according to a recent development brief by the World Bank (Ratha, Mohapatra and 
Silwal, 2009). The top remittance receiving countries in 2008 were India, China, Mexico, 
Philippines and Poland (See Appendix for a graphical presentation of World Bank data).  
For some developing countries, remittances exceed any other forms of foreign financial 
flows such as foreign aid as well as foreign direct investments (FDI). Remittances also 
amount to a significant portion of developing country GDPs. For example, remittances 
make up an astonishing 46%, 39% and 34% of the GDPs of Tajikistan, Tonga and 
Moldova respectively (World Bank, 2008).  
This outstanding extent of financial flows moving from developed countries to 
developing countries indicates significant potential for impacting economic progress in 
the developing world. At the micro-level, remittances are personal transactions between a 
migrant and his relatives. Therefore, they typically cater directly to the most pertinent 
needs of the receiving household. Also, because migrants usually choose to move to more 
thriving and stable economies, their earnings, and thus their remitted transactions, 
represent a stable source of income for struggling households who are often vexed by 
fluctuations in their income. The capacity of family members to share information on 
economic constraints and needs makes remittances more effective at targeting the 
specific economic constraints facing households in the developing world. Whereas 
foreign aid, which is often, plagued by management and governance problems, is usually 
granted with restrictions on how it can be utilized. Considering the severity of the poverty 
that exists in developing countries and the economic volatility facing low-income 
populations in these regions, the possibility of a stable means to diversify income, 
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accumulate savings, access credit, and manage risks through the income of a migrant 
family member, has considerable implications. In addition to the household level impact 
of remittances, the macro implications of remittances are also impressive. Remittances 
represent the largest source of foreign exchange earnings and help developing nations to 
repay debts as well as acquire credit for external borrowing. A recent “Migration and 
Development Brief” by the World Bank states about the impact of remittances on 
developing countries during times of economic crisis: 
 “At over $300 billion a year, remittance flows provide an enormous source of 
development financing. In the near-term, the resilience of these flows has made them 
even more important as a source of external financing, offering a ray of home in these 
difficult times. “(Ratha et. al, 2009) 
 
 While the potential for remittances to boost development in developing regions 
seems promising, the actual impacts of remittances are not so clear. Empirical research 
on the impact of remittances on some regions such as in Bangladesh and Uganda 
demonstrates a reduction in poverty headcount and greater investment in education and 
healthcare due to a loosening of budget constraints which previously barred these 
investments. Research also indicates that remittances generate new jobs in the local 
economy through multiplier effects (World Bank GEP, 2006; see also Hossain, 2007). A 
large multinational survey project that investigates the impact of remittances in 74 
countries also supports that remittances have a significantly positive impact on poverty in 
the developing world (Adams and Page, 2005). On the other hand, some research also 
shows that remittances can induce dependency, create moral hazard problems (as 
receiving household members reduce their participation in the labor force), decrease 
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attempts to save, and also encourage riskier investments (Chami, Fullenkamp and Jahjah, 
2003).  
 
The different findings on the impact of remittances on different communities suggest 
that the factors that affect and determine remittances among different pools of migrants 
and households must be studied in order to gain a comprehensive understanding of the 
impact of remittances on development. This paper will look at the case of remittances in a 
region of rural Bangladesh and use empirical data on the demographics of receiving 
households, family ties between migrants and households, and forms of utilization, to 
determine the motivation of remittances and the role of household ties in impacting 
remittances.   
First, in Section 1.1, we will take a brief look at some features of remittances that 
characterize them as a unique set of money transfers that are different from other foreign 
financial flows such as foreign aid and foreign direct investment (FDI) funds. Next, in 
Section 1.2, we will look at some of the literature on different models of migration. We 
will focus briefly on two main theories of migration, because migration is a precondition 
to remittances, and research on migration shows that the issues that influence migration 
are frequently crucial in determining the patterns of sending and receiving remittances. In 
Section 2 we will look at the empirical data from rural Bangladesh. Finally, in Section 3, 
we will consider a new area in remittance research - diaspora philanthropy.   
1.1 Trends in Remittances 
Stability 
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      Stability of financial flows denotes low volatility or less shifts in the economy 
due to either favorable or unfavorable shocks (Salomone, 2006; see also Ratha, 2004). 
Remittances to migrant-sending nations are considered stable because they are less 
volatile than other forms of financial flows, like ODA (Official Development Assistance) 
and FDI (Foreign Direct Investment), which are more prone to sharp withdrawals or 
increases based on the economic climate.  Salomone(2006) points out that while FDIs 
and capital market flows had fallen in 2005 and 2006 due to recession in high income 
countries, remittances continued to increase during this time. Similarly from 1998 to 
2001, when revenues from private capital flows suffered due to the Asian financial crisis, 
remittances to developing countries continued to rise. Salomone states that even when 
remittances do respond to acute economic situations in the recipient countries, “the 
decline of remittances and volatility have been much smaller than those of other capital 
flows, meaning they affected by the investment climate in recipient countries in the same 
manner as capital flows, though to a much lesser degree” (Salomone, 2006).  
      Research conducted by the World Bank that examined remittance against 
factors such as corruption, inequality, domestic debt, openness, financial development 
and country risk found that while remittance receipts averaged 0.5% of GDP of countries 
with higher than median level of corruption, it averaged to 1.9% of GDP of countries 
with lower than median level of corruption. This study also found that countries that had 
greater openness in trade and greater financial development also received larger 
remittances. 
      Two characteristics of remittances which explain their stability in contrast 
with other sources of financial flow such as ODA and FDI, are that they are private 
8 
 
transactions characterized by solidarity motives with the home country. These factors 
remain stable even in times of economic crisis. An altruistic remitter will continue to 
send money to the household in times of crisis, and will most likely increase the amount 
of the transactions. However, even if the migrant remittances are a form of investment, 
remittances still do not decrease as sharply as other portfolio investments in response to 
downturns in the home economy, because of the migrant’s strong intentions to invest in 
the home country despite the unprofitability of such investments in times of economic 
difficulty. Whereas foreigners, who are largely responsible for generating foreign direct 
investments, are less likely to make investments during hard times.  
      Remittances have been seen to serve as macroeconomic stabilizers, but they 
can also take the form of investments in the receiving country, and the cyclicality of 
remittances in reference to the home country GDP is one indication that distinguishes 
between these different motivations for  remittances. However, it should be noted that 
while investment remittances may decline in response to economic downturns, 
investment from  migrants rarely fall as sharply as other foreign investments, and are thus 
still characterized by stability. 
Cyclicality  
      To discern how remittances take effect, it is important to consider whether the 
motives behind remittances are altruistic ,formed out of solidarity with the household or 
home country, or portfolio investment interests. Whether remittances are countercyclical, 
procyclical or acyclical with the GDP of receiving countries are also important indicators. 
Cyclicality is the relationship between the net capital flows into a country and its output. 
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Remittances are said to be countercyclical if are negatively correlated with the business 
cycle of a country, i.e. if remittances into a country increase in bad times and remittances 
out of a country increase in good times. However, this countercyclicality should not be 
misinterpreted as instability. , Though they may increase or decrease in amount, 
remittances rarely ever drop sharply as remittances. Instead, countercyclicality itself 
indicates that remittances can be counted on during bad economic times. 
On the other hand, if remittances into a country when the economy of the country 
is going well is an indication of procyclicality. If there is no statistically significant 
correlation between a country’s business cycle and remittance then it is said to be 
acyclical.  
      Remittances are important to many developing countries because they are sent by 
migrants to compensate low points of economic performance in their home countries. In 
this case, remittances have a more altruistic motivation behind them and usually behave 
countercyclically. For developing countries in which recipient families live close to 
subsistence levels and depend heavily on remittance income, migrants may increase 
remittances in times of hardship. This makes remittances vital to the resilience of some 
developing countries as they serve as macroeconomic stabilizers that help to minimize 
large fluctuations in the national income.  
      Conversely, if remittances are sent as self-interested investments in the receiving 
country then they will display procyclicality. Migrants are more likely to send 
remittances to their country when the economic climate there is conducive to investments 
(Salmone, 2006). 
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      When looking at cyclicality of remittances it is important to consider the economic 
situation of the host country. If the GDP of the host country correlates with the cycle of 
the GDP of the home country, then it is more difficult for migrants to send a part of their 
income as remittances during hard times (Salomone, 2006), 
      The cyclicality and motives of remittances are important issues today because they 
are key factors in the discussion of whether it is possible for countries to cite potential 
future remittances as collateral as a way to overcome liquidity constraints for 
international loans in times of economic crisis. 
Sustainability  
     Sustainability of remittances can be defined as  the relationship between the duration 
of migrants’ stay in destination countries and the level of remittances sent back home 
(Salomone,2006). Most of the literature on the sustainability of remittances has stated 
that there is a negative correlation between the duration of a migrants’ stay in host 
countries and the amount of remittances sent back to the home countries. This is 
evidenced by the decrease and in some cases the end of remittances sent back home with 
time. It is widely argued that this feature of negative correlation becomes apparent after 
five years of permanent stay abroad, whereas during the initial five years remittances are 
usually on the rise. The International Organization of Migration (IOM) states that the 
turning point in the relationship between the intention to remit and the time spent abroad 
occurs when the legal status of the migrant changes or when migrants receive an open-
ended labor contract(see Salomone, 2006).  This correlation also exists whether the 
remittances are sent for altruistic motives or portfolio investment motives. In both cases, 
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there is still an average decrease in remittances after five years of permanence abroad. 
For those migrants remitting with altruistic motives based on solidarity with the home 
country, this decreased sustainability can be due to ties with the home country weakens 
over time. Migrants that remit for investment purposes do so because they expect to gain 
from their investments once they return to the home countries. However, if they no longer 
expect to return then their interest in investing diminishes over time.   
 Accordingly, research on migration patterns and remittances have also shown that 
temporary migrants, are more likely to remit than migrants who intend to settle in the 
destination region, and that the decline in remittances is less prevalent among temporary 
migrants (Pinger, 2007). However, temporary migrants are also frequently characterized 
by lower education and skill background and receive low-wage jobs in host countries, 
whereas long-term migrants tend to be highly educated and become employed in the 
more lucrative skilled sector (Siddiqui, 2004). 
      The sustainability of remittances is an important issue, especially with respect to 
highly skilled migrants who have the potential to remit significant amounts back to their 
home countries. This is also related to the issue of the brain drain that impacts the home 
countries. Skilled migrants tend to live abroad for a longer time. They also have a higher 
tendency to a “reunification effect” which is “the intention of the migrant of living with 
his family in the host country.”5 When this “reunification effect” is stronger than the 
“wage effect”, which is the potential increase in the amount remitted due to the higher 
skills embedded by the migrant”, then the negative correlation between the time spent 
abroad and intention to remit takes place (Salomone, 2006). It should also be considered 
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that highly skilled migrants are also likely to come from wealthier families therefore they 
may not face as much of a need to remit.  
The characteristics of remittances, discussed in this section, indicate that these 
financial flows, often characterized by stability and acyclicality, could have a significant 
impact in relieving economic pressures on receiving families. However, as the discussion 
on sustainability implies, the continuation of remittances is partially determined by the 
presence of the motivation to remit, which has a tendency to decline over time. Thus, 
understanding why migrants make the decision to remit is an important consideration for 
any study of the potential usefulness of remittances. This paper aims to present a brief 
theoretical discussion of the motivation of migrant remittances, followed by an analysis 
of empirical data  on remittance-receiving households from a rural region of Bangladesh. 
Before we embark on a theoretical discussion of the motivation for remitting, we 
will first turn to literature on two prominent theories of labor migration, the neoclassical 
model and new economics of migration. This is because, in order to understand the origin 
and determinants of remittances, it is important to understand the origins of migration which 
always precedes remittances. Moreover, many studies have shown that the factors determining 
remittances are often predicated by the factors that contribute to the decision to migrate. (Though 
there are also studies that have shown that these two factors are not related (see Funkhouser, 
1995), and we will address this in section 1.3) 
1.2 Understanding migration 
1.2.1  Neoclassical Theory of Migration 
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The Neoclassical model explains migration based on labor market considerations. 
This model has both micro and macro components, and several scholars have contributed 
to the development and extension of each of these components. The macro theory, 
developed by Harris and Todaro(1969) and Todaro(1976) relies on a simple labor supply 
and demand model such that countries with a small endowment of labor relative to capital 
will have high wages, whereas countries with a large labor endowment relative to capital 
will have low wages. An assumption of the Harris-Todaro model (1969) is that expected 
wages in urban areas is the driving force behind rural-urban migration. It posits that the 
differences in wages between regions adjusted for unemployment rates in the destination 
area are the main factors causing migration. Due to the difference in expected wages, 
between regions with a high capital to labor ratio and low labor wages and regions with 
low capital to labor ratio and high labor wages, there will be a labor supply from the 
capital-poor regions to the capital-rich regions. Conversely, there will also be a flow of 
capital, including human capital (skilled workers), from capital-rich regions to capital-
poor regions due to the relatively higher capital productivity in capital-poor regions. 
These opposite flows of capital will decrease wages in their destination regions and 
increase wages in their source regions. More clearly, due to labor out-migration from 
capital-poor to capital-rich regions, the reduced labor the capital-poor regions will place 
upward pressures on labor wages, while increased labor supply in capital-rich regions 
will place downward pressures on labor-wages. Thus, the neoclassical model predicts that 
migration of both labor (and capital) will lead to an equilibrium in labor wages (and 
capital wages) in the entire labor market, and any remaining wage differential will be a 
measure of the costs of migration (Massey et. al, 1993). 
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The micro component of the neoclassical theory of migration holds that 
international migration is composed of a sum of individual decisions to migrate based on 
labor market differentials (Sjaastad, 1962). Sjaastad presents migration as an investment 
in individual resources. Individuals choose to migrate when an analysis of costs and 
benefits of migration indicates a positive return on migration.  Thus, migration 
considerations are made up of individual monetary and non-monetary costs and returns of 
migration. Some examples of monetary costs are increased costs of food, living and 
transportation in the destination region, as well as foregone earning in the home region. 
Sjaastad (1962) also explains that migrants consider non-material costs of migrating, such 
as the “psychic” costs of leaving their home region costs of cutting old ties and making 
new ones, adjusting to a new culture and language, as well as the effort of learning new 
sets of skills for a new job market, etc. These costs are investments in human capital on 
the part of the individual. Thus individuals choose to migrate to those areas where they 
expect to receive the highest returns from migration to offset these costs (Sjaastad, 1962; 
see also Massey et. al, 1993). Similarly, non-monetary returns involve migrant 
preferences for the destination region, such as utility gained from the climate, culture, 
etc., while monetary returns are a function of  increased earnings, or increased capacity as 
a consumer, which can involve reduced prices, reduced costs of employment, etc. 
(Sjaastad,1962).  The most prominent expected benefit of migration is higher wages, 
which is a compound of considerations on the level of wages in another country 
compared to the origin country, and the likelihood of being hired in the country. The 
individual nature of the considerations presented by Sjaastad explains why certain people 
from a region migrate while others do not. This is because, the decision to migrate 
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depends on such individual variables as level of education, sex, age, work experience, 
etc., which can all contribute to a person’s expectation of being employed in another 
region. The tendency of an individual to migrate increases if the individual has human 
capital characteristics that will either increase the probability of employment, or increase 
the level of wages the migrant will receive in the host country. Thus, it predicts that 
individuals with higher levels of education, experience, and job training are more likely 
to expect higher earnings abroad, and thus are more likely to migrate. Similarly, variables 
that lower the costs of migration, for example the presence of family members in the 
country of destination, will increase the tendency of a person to migrate. On the other 
hand, Sjaastad(1962) finds that age is associated negatively with the likelihood of 
migrating, because individual expectation of returns on investments decreases with age. 
Even non-material aspects, such as one’s expectation of wage differential between two 
regions to eventually converge, which can differ significantly among different 
individuals, can lead to a reduced likelihood of migrating. 
As an extension of the neoclassical model, we can assume that migration only 
occurs due to different labor market conditions and that if wage levels equalize across 
two countries then there will be no need for migration. Similarly, this model implies that 
the size of migration flows is determined by the size of the differential in wages and labor 
market conditions between different regions. Thus, in order to control immigration, 
governments should try to change expected earnings in either the source or host regions – 
for example, to decrease emigration a country should try increase expected earnings for 
its labor population (Massey et. al, 1993).  
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 There are very few long-term empirical studies that investigate whether the 
neoclassical theory applies to international migration. Sjaastad(1962) states that in order 
for his model of migration to apply, “there must be no barriers to the free movement of 
labor and other inputs among industries or across space”. Thus empirical research that 
tests the neoclassical assumptions of the interaction between migration and the labor 
market and wage differentials have been somewhat limited to intra-national rural-urban 
migration or migration between nations of close proximity and strong ties which would 
reduce legal barriers to migration. 
  Fleisher (1963) and Maldonado (1976) find a strong relationship between 
unemployment levels in Puerto Rico and increasing migration to the United States. 
Maldonado (1976) was also able to show a positive correlation between increasing wage 
differential between the two nations and migration to the United States. Her research also 
found evidence of upward force on labor wages in Puerto Rico due to out-migration, 
which is consistent with neoclassical predictions.  Castillo-Freeman and Freeman (1992) 
found that following the institution of a minimum wage law in 1974, there were shifts in 
selectivity of migration such that migration to the United States increased more 
selectively for low-wage workers, whereas more skilled and educated Puerto-Ricans 
living in the United States tended to migrate back to Puerto Rico. This is because the 
required minimum wages required most companies to increase their wages, thus many 
companies opted to exclude much of their labor from the production process, causing 
increased out-migration among low-skilled workers.  
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 Jenkins (1977) also provided evidence for the neoclassical assumptions on wage 
differentials and migration in his research on Mexico-USA migration. His study found 
that the prominent disparity in wage levels between agricultural labor wages in Mexico 
compared to agricultural wages in the United States had a strong relationship with rates 
of migration to USA. His study also found that an increase in factors that contributed to 
higher expected wages in Mexico, such as investment in agriculture, commodity prices, 
wages, and agricultural productivity, resulted in a decrease in emigration to USA 
(Jenkins, 1977; see also Massey, et. al, 1994). 
 However, for this study, we will be looking at migration determinants on a micro 
level. A study that involves some of the micro variables we will be looking at is 
described in Taylor’s article, “Undocumented Mexico-U.S. Migration and the Returns to 
Households in Rural Mexico” (1987). It focuses on expected income gain of rural 
Mexican households from the migration of a family member to urban areas. Although, 
this study fits the model of new economics of migration (another model of migration 
discussed below), the findings also serve as empirical evidence for the assumptions of the 
neoclassical model.  
Taylor used individual and household level characteristics to determine household 
members’ physical and human capital, such as sex, age and education, as well as 
“migration capital”, such as whether the individual has contacts in the destination region, 
in order to determine which family members will face lower costs of migration, and 
greater likelihood of being employed in urban industries. Using these variables, he 
developed an  indicator of the difference in expected contribution to family income of 
individuals who have migrated and individuals who have remained in the home region. 
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Taylor expected that a large earning differential between a person’s expected income as 
migrant compared to his income as a non-migrant would be the main factor determining 
whether that family member migrates. In order to determine the expected migrant and 
non-migrant earnings of each person, Taylor used data on contributions by migrants and 
non-migrants in the past against a set of their physical and human capital characteristics 
to predict what each person’s contribution would be in the previous year as USA 
migrants and Mexican residents. The difference between these two sets of expected 
earnings is the expected earning differential due to migration.  Thus, the findings also 
helped to determine the loss to Mexican households due to the migration of a family 
member.   
 The results of the study revealed that migration was a means of allocation of 
labor for households looking to maximize their resources. Taylor(1987) stated that most 
migration from rural Mexican regions were temporary and largely funded by other family 
members. Therefore, most migrants remitted back a large portion of their incomes to the 
household. Another significant finding was that the most productive rural inhabitants, or 
those family members that are expected to contribute most to the household as workers in 
the source rural region, are selected to not migrate. Hence, migration has a positive 
impact on Mexican villages as the most productive members are not lost to migration, 
and at the same time families benefit from remittances from family members who do 
migrate. Although, this resource allocation strategy describes the family contract model 
of the new economics of migration model, the assumptions for which Taylor helped 
develop in his other studies in Stark and Taylor (1989), the findings of this study also 
support that an expectation of increased earnings from migration, based on physical and 
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human capital considerations, partially motivates the decision to migrate, which is central 
to neoclassical understanding of migration.    
 Howeverit is important to note that if migration is indeed predicted by individual 
profit maximization motive then remittances are not likely to arise (Massey et. al, 1994). 
Generally, in the neoclassical model, migrants impact the home economy only by causing 
labor supply shifts which impact the labor market conditions, such as for example, 
worker wage increases in response to a reduction in labor supply from outmigration. 
Another model of migration, the new economics of migration, suggests, instead, that 
migrants continue to be an active part of the home economy through remittances they 
send to their households. We look at this model next.   
 
1.2.2 New economics of Migration 
This model came into prominence in Oded Stark and David E. Bloom’s 1985 
paper titled “The New Economics of Labor Migration”. Under this model, a wider social 
entity is collectively responsible for individual migration (Stark and Bloom, 1985) and 
both parties are mutually interdependent. The theory states that the decision to migrate is 
made by units of related people, usually the migrant and the non-migrating family, rather 
than only the individual migrant. In this theory of migration, the family unit decides to 
allocate its labor resources not only to maximize family income, but also to minimize 
risks to the economic security of the family. Later extensions of this model (see Stark, 
1991) have also shown that the family arrangement to send a member abroad allows the 
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family to avoid the pressures of missing or imperfect markets in the sending country, 
such as insurance and capital markets. 
Often this model is described in terms of a family contract model such that both 
parties, migrant and non-migrant members of a household, make a contractual 
arrangement to share the costs and returns from migration. Transportation costs and pre-
employment living expenses are examples of migrant costs that the family shares, while 
remittances are an important example of returns from migration. The mutual agreement is 
a function of joint utility maximization in which the migrant and the non-migrating 
family determine a means to maximize their utility over two areas, the home and host 
country (Hoddinott , 1994; Taylor, 1987).  The migrant receives financial support from 
the family with the initial investments in migration, such as transportation costs, and 
living expenses during the initial period of unemployment.  The family also provides 
some form of unemployment insurance (Stark and Bloom, 1985). On the other hand, once 
the migrant has a job, under the mutual contract model, s/he will send back remittances 
which provide the family with crucial financial assistance. 
 Neoclassical theory assumes that all other markets are functional and 
immigration is a response to unequal labor market conditions (such as wage differentials) 
between two regions. New economics of migration, on the other hand, states that 
migration is a means for households to not only increase income but also, to relieve the 
impact of failures of local markets, such as the insurance and credit markets. This model 
is particularly relevant in rural agricultural settings where household incomes are 
dependent on unpredictable environmental events. In this setting remittances offer key 
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financial insurance against loss of income due to crop damage, or unproductive seeds, 
etc, and guarantee some level of economic stability for the family (Stark and Bloom, 
1985). This is a very significant role of remittances because insurance markets are usually 
not well-developed in developing countries, and even when they are, the rural farming 
families frequently cannot afford access to them (Massey et. al, 1993). Thus without 
insurance against loss or damage of crops, the family’s livelihood can be threatened by an 
unforeseen loss in their produce. Therefore, the family has a strong incentive to diversify 
their sources of income with the income of a migrant family member, in order to avoid 
complete vulnerability to income loss (Stark and Levhari, 1982). The income earned by a 
family member in another region can help secure family well-being and insure against a 
severe loss of livelihood in times of local economic fluctuations. This insurance aspect of 
remittances is most effective when the host country’s economy is either negatively or 
weakly correlated the source country’s economy., in addition to wage differentials, the 
new economics of migration predicts that families also take this into consideration in 
choosing the destination locations (Stark and Bloom, 1985; Massey et. al, 1993).   
Besides providing insurance, remittances can also provide families access to 
credit for investments in productive activities. Investments such as purchasing new 
farming equipment or better strain of seeds are crucial ways for rural families to boost 
their production, and their income. However, low-income families in developing nations 
face heavy capital constraints because they seldom have access to reliable credit markets 
to borrow money for these costly investments. In an economy with missing or imperfect 
credit and capital markets, remittances sent from a family member can act as a source of 
capital for funds necessary for the family to invest in increased productivity. This 
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contradicts neoclassical theory, which assumes that if migrants send home a part of their 
income to their households, then this income will increase the household’s income 
unitarily. Further, according to the neoclassical model, this additional income will only 
boost consumption, and should not contribute to any further income-generating activities 
(Massey et. al, 1994).  
Empirical evidence in a survey project conducted by Fletcher and Taylor (1992) 
in the Michoacan state of Mexico, shows however that, households use received 
remittances to boost production, increasing purchases of inputs like hired labor, farm 
machinery, and land. Another study, done by Taylor and Wyatt (1993) also offers 
empirical evidence that reception of remittances increases the likelihood of household 
consumption of goods and services that help generate income, such as education, 
equipment, and more livestock. Furthermore, a study done by Taylor (1992) shows that 
remittances have long-term asset-accumulation effects on Mexican farm households. This 
suggests that remittances, contrary to the neoclassical model, have a non-unitary effect, 
because they increase household income by more than the remitted amount through 
investments in income-generating goods and assets, rather than just general consumption. 
The role of remittances as capital occurs especially in regions where households face 
heavy capital and credit constraints preventing growth in household production, and 
where families must consider a significant risk of loss of produce and income (Stark and 
Levhari, 1982). Thus new economics of migration holds that remittances received by 
households cans serve as both insurance against loss, and credit for reducing capital 
constraints and engaging in more production. 
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In keeping with the mutual benefits of the family contract model, while the 
migrant remits to offer the family financial support, the family also offers services to the 
migrant (Stark and Bloom 1985).  Lucas and Stark (1985) posit an investment 
arrangement between the migrant and the household, in which remittances function as a 
repayment of the household’s investment in the migrant’s education. Analysis of remitted 
sums and education-level of migrants by Johnson and Whitelaw(1974) in their study on 
Kenyan rural-urban remittance transfers show a strong correlation between an increase in 
the amount remitted and the increase in migrant education. They referred to these 
findings as proof of an investment structure, within which the family supports the 
migrant’s growth in human capital, and in return receives repayment with interest on their 
investment in the form of remittances. 
 Lucas and Stark refine this logic by controlling for the possibility that the 
increased remitted amounts are not just a function of higher wages, which are also 
strongly correlated to level of education. This tendency of the migrant to increase the 
amount of remittances in response to increased wages, is consistent with the altruism 
model of explaining remittances (discussed later in section 1.3). Instead, Lucas and Stark 
claim that, if remittances are a part of an investment arrangement, there will likely be a 
differential in how the remitted amount changes in response to an equivalent increase in 
education among different family members.  The increase in remittance amounts can be 
shown to correlate more positively with the increase in education of those members of the 
household in whose education the household is more likely to have invested in (such as 
the children of the head of the household), than with the increase in education of other 
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members (such as sons and daughters-in-law, spouses, uncles, etc.) in whose education 
the household is less likely to be heavily invested. 
 Lucas and Stark found this hypothesis to be supported by their data in Botswana. 
They found that by including a dummy “own young” which is equivalent one for 
children, grandchildren and nieces and nephews of the head of the household, they were 
able to discern a significantly greater increase in remittances due to increase in education 
levels of this group of family members, than when this variable is not included. This is 
indicative of a repayment structure for investment in education. Besides education, an 
investment model simply suggests that the more a household invests in the costs of 
migration, the greater the amount of remittances transferred by the migrant (Lucas and 
Stark, 1985). 
In an agricultural setting,  the migrant family member may benefit from the 
family looking after any land or livestock the migrant may own in his absence (in 
addition to the other forms of support and unemployment insurance mentioned above.) 
Also, often an incentive for migrant children to continue remitting, under the contractual 
model, is the promise of inheritance. In this case, the household’sownership of some 
threshold level of inheritable land is positively related to the likelihood of migrating, as 
these landed families are more likely to support migration of a family member. In a study 
of rural Western Kenya, Hoddinott (1994) finds evidence that the mutual contract model 
applies, and that the level of remittances is contingent on the ability of the parents to 
reward the “good behaviour” of the migrant through promises of inheritance (see also 
Lucas and Stark, 1985). 
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Unlike the neoclassical model, migration under the family arrangement model 
does not simply serve the purpose of maximizing income. In fact, it is consistent with this 
model for families to send family members even when there is no significant wage 
differential between the host and home region (Massey et. al, 1993; Bauer and 
Zimmermann, 1995). The main purpose for migration and remittances in this model is to 
secure the economic well-being of the family by providing insurance against fluctuations 
in locally earned income, as well as providing an alternate source of funds for productive 
investments. Thus under the family contract model, the source of the income matters, 
however income maximization is not necessary. Also, unlike the neoclassical model, the 
new economics of migration does not simply involve laborers leaving local economies to 
enter foreign high-wage economies. Rather families try to diversify their income by 
engaging in both the local as well as the foreign economy (Stark and Bloom, 1985). It 
follows then that a rise in wage levels or improvement in the local economy might in fact 
increase emigration as it makes families more capable of supporting migration of a 
family member. Besides making changes to the wage level, governments can influence 
immigration by changing the availability of insurance and credit markets. 
1.3 Motivations of Remittances 
 We now address the question of why migrants remit. Though our discussion on 
migration would suggest that the reason for remitting is closely tied to the reason for 
migration itself, however, there is still reason to study the motivation for remittances on 
its own. This is because though they are closely connected and interdependent, migration 
and remittances are distinct phenomena, as not all migrants remit. Similarly, not all 
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remitters who have migrated from similar economic regions remit in the same way. A 
study which closely informs this reasoning is Edward Funkhouser’s study on comparing 
remittance patterns in the capital cities of El Salvador and Nicaragua (1995). He found 
that while both cities have similar number of migrants and similar economic conditions, 
twice as many households in San Salvador received remittances. Moreover, of the 
households that received remittances, the average amount of remittances received per 
capita in San Salvador was twice as much as per capita remittances received in Managua.  
Funkhouser (1995) conducted a comparative analysis of micro-level household and 
migrant characteristics to determine if the difference in remittance patterns originated due 
to differences in the pool of migrants. However, the analysis revealed that the migrants 
were similar in terms of age, gender, education and even the time of migration. Despite 
these similarities, a comparison of remittance sending patterns between the pool of 
migrants reveal sharp disparities in remittance sending behavior. Thus the results suggest 
that while migrants may share similar factors that lead to migration, the factors that 
determine whether they will remit can be different and unrelated. Thus, we will look at 
some prominent theories of motivation for remitting.  
1.3.1 Altruism  vs. Self-interest 
One of the earliest and most prominent explanations for the question of why migrants 
choose to remit was altruism, though different models of altruism exist (Rapoport and 
Docquier, 2005). Here we will look at the model of altruism which claims that the utility 
of the migrant is a function of both his utility as well as his family’s utility. If altruism 
holds then the level of migrant’s remittances should positively correlate to migrant 
income, and negatively correlate to the income of the recipient household. Salomone 
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(2006) points out some other features of remittances motivated by altruism: There should 
be inverse relationship between the sustainability of the remittances and presence of 
immediate family members in the host country. Also, remittance levels should be 
countercyclical to the home economy, such that it rises when the home economy is 
suffering.  Altruistic remittances are also positively related to family ties with the 
receiving household as a strong emotional attachment with family members could 
increase the feelings of care and concern over their well-being (Dalen, Groenewold, & 
Fokkema, 2005).  
One of the complications in discerning whether remittances are motivated by altruism 
is that the predictions of an altruistic model often match the predictions made by another 
explanation of remittance-sending motivation, self-interest. Both models predict that 
remittances would increase in response to a negative income shock to the receiving 
family. However, the reasons for this increase in remittances according to the two models 
are quite distinct.  
The theory of self-interest is another extreme of an explanation that, like altruism, 
also ties migrant remittance behavior to household level considerations. Unlike altruism, 
however, the self-interest explanation offered by Lucas and Stark (1985) suggest that 
remittances could be tied to the desire to inherit wealth and assets from the receiving 
household, to purchase the service of the household in maintaining his assets owned in 
the home country, or as a means to establish increase one’s reputation in the home 
community in preparation for return. In all of the above instances, the remittances serve 
as an investment on behalf of the migrant and indicate that the migrant expects to return 
to the home country. In this situation, remittance transactions will be sustained as long as 
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the migrant is abroad but once he departs those investments should drop to zero 
(Salomone, 2006). Hodinott (2004) conducted an empirical study in among rural 
households in western Kenya in which the remitting behavior of migrants displayed an 
investment in the wealth of the household, which they eventually hope to inherit. In this 
instance, remittances are a function of the household’s ability to rewards the remittance-
sending of migrants (i.e. houses well –endowed with land, livestock, businesses and other 
inheritable wealth) (Hodinott, 2004; see also Agarwal and Horowitz, 2002).  
1.3.2  Mutually Beneficent Contract Model  
While both altruistic and self-interested remittance-sending can have overlapping 
results in which receiving families receive greater remittances in times of economic 
downturn, Lucas and Stark(1985) propose a variable that can be tested to clarify the 
distinction between the two contrasting migrant behaviors. They premise their argument 
on the observation that under the self-interest model, receiving households are able to 
attract remittances from self-interested agents by exhibiting remittances some form of 
“bargaining power” . Thus it holds that self-interested remittance-levels will increase as 
bargaining power of families increase, which in turn is dependent on the family’s wealth. 
Therefore, self-interested remittances will be positive correlated to increase in recipient 
household wealth. This is exactly contrary to altruistic behavior, which predicts that 
remittances should increase for households with lower wealth-levels (Lucas and Stark, 
2005; see also Dalen, Groenewold, & Fokkema, 2005). 
             It can be intuitively understood that altruism and self-interest represent two 
extreme possibilities and can only serve as partial explanations for different remittance 
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patterns. Lucas and Stark (1985) eventually propose that a more far-reaching explanation 
of remittance motivations is an integration of the altruistic and self-interested concepts 
which they termed as “tempered altruism” or “enlightened self-interest.”  
Figure 1: Remittance motivations in the new economics of labour migration 
 
Based on Lucas and Stark (1985) extracted from: Carling (2008)  
 
In this analysis, remittances are seen as a part of a mutually beneficial contract between 
the migrant and the receiving family. This concept is a part of the “new economics of 
labor migration” model described above. In a mutual arrangement, remittances serve two 
major functions - repayment on the costs of migration, and education costs borne by the 
family, and insurance against risks for the household in the country of origin. The first 
function describes remittances as a return on the family’s investment in the human capital 
of the migrant. The risk-mitigation component is a more frequently cited function of 
remittances in a mutual contract model. In this case the family supports the migrant in the 
initial stages of job search, thus providing a form of unemployment insurance, however, 
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more importantly, once the migrant has a job, he can provide the family financial and 
capital support in adverse economic situations, thus allowing for greater consumption –
smoothing. The insurance function of remittances enables receiving families to engage in 
riskier investments which are expected to have higher-yields (Agarwal and Horowitz, 
2002).  The risk-management aspect of remittances can be successfully executed if the 
host economy is negatively or weakly correlated to the source economy, so that the 
migrant income is not affected by fluctuations in the home economy.(Stark and Bloom, 
1985; see also Carling, 2008)  
 
  
Lucas and Stark(1985) further posit that the mutual contract is self-enforcing. 
This self-enforcing nature of remittances combines both self-interest and altruism. A 
migrant can continue remitting because he intends to inherit, or that he wants to ensure 
that his assets in the source country are being looked after, or because he is concerned 
with his prestige in his community in the source country, or a combination of some or all 
of these motivations. At the same time however, self-enforcement can also be explained 
by the migrant’s utility from the well-being of the family and explains the mutually 
beneficial arrangement of the contract. Altruism, and its emphasis on strong attachment 
to the family, also explains why these mutually beneficial contracts of remittances exist 
within families rather than between migrants and non-related bodies of people as a 
business contract. 
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 We now move onto an empirical study of rural households in the rural region of 
Mirzapur, Bangladesh.  
 
 
 
Section 2: Empirical Study on the Motivation for Remittances: 
Bangladesh 
2.1 Introduction 
The previous section outlines two of the most prominent theories on labor 
migration, the neoclassical theory, and the new economics of labor migration. We also 
looked at some possible theories on what motivates remittances, altruism and self-
interest, and finally a partial integration of both , proposed by Lucas and Stark in 1985, 
the mutually beneficial contract model.  
For this project, we are concerned with understanding what motivates remittances 
to rural Bangladesh, using a 2009 data set from Mirzapur, Bangladesh. The most 
commonly cited ideas on motivation are, as previously discussed, altruism and self-
interest. Altruism holds that the migrants’ utility is dependent on the utility of the origin 
household, and thus the increased utility of the household provides incentive for 
remittance. Typically, this theory characterizes strong ties between the migrant and the 
household. Self-interest as a motivation for remittance implies that the migrant remits to 
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secure investments within the home country for an expected return, such as inheritance or 
maintenance of his possessions by the household in his absence. 
However, from their empirical study on remittances in Botswana, Lucas and Stark 
proposed a new theory of motivation for remittances, which they termed as “enlightened 
self-interest” (or “tempered altruism”). This model consists of a contract between the 
household and the migrant that serves the personal interests of both parties, and is 
therefore mutually beneficial. Remittances occur in context of repayment on the 
household’s investment in the migrant’s human capital and migration costs, as well as a 
component of a coinsurance agreement between the household and the migrant. In the 
coinsurance agreement the migrant receives support from the household during periods of 
job search or joblessness, while the migrant remits to the household to insure it against 
unexpected decreases in income, and risky investments to increase production.  Thus the 
migrant enjoys income from overseas job (usually higher wages)  and family services 
such as maintenance of his property and business back home, while the household enjoys 
the insurance offered by income-diversification. In this way the migrant and the 
household to maximize their joint utility over the home and destination (often termed as 
“host”) regions. Remittances are driven by self interest under a family contract because 
the model predicts that migrants remit to secure services of the family, to secure his 
reputation in society upon his eventual return, and to increase his chances of inheriting 
from the household. At the same time, the existence of remittances between relatives in a 
household rather than any unrelated group of people entering into a mutually beneficial 
contract suggests the presence of altruism.  Thus, both components of self-interest and 
altruism contribute to the longevity of the agreement by making it self-enforcing. 
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 Lucas and Stark (1985) consider pure self-interest or pure altruism as extremes of 
the mutually beneficial contract model. However, empirically discerning altruism from 
self-interest or even the family contract model (enlightened self-interest) is difficult as 
remittances under both motivations have similar outcomes. A commonly cited similarity 
in remittance literature is the increase in remittances in response to adverse income 
shocks under both altruism and self-interest, and even the family coinsurance contract. 
However, Lucas and Stark (1985) posits that under self-interest of the family contract 
model, the increase in remittances will be even greater for households with more land, 
livestock and other forms of wealth, whereas altruism predicts the inverse situation, 
where the less wealthier households receive more remittances (see also Dalen, 
Groenewold and Fokkema 2003). Another distinction that Dalen, Groenewold and 
Fokkema (2003) use to examine the motivation of remittances flowing into Egypt, 
Morocco and Turkey, is the relationship between years abroad and the level of 
remittances. They hold that under altruism remittances should gradually decline as family 
ties weaken as the migrant spends a longer time away from home, while under self-
interest and the family contract model, remittance levels should be remain stable during 
the period of the contract and then decline sharply when the contract expires. Other 
research studies have shown a few other empirical differences which make the motivation 
for remittances more distinctive, and we will point these out in our discussion of our 
choice of variables later in this paper.  (see also Appendix A for a table of predictions 
extracted from Docquier and Rapoport (2005)) 
In this study we utilize data on household and migrant characteristics to 
understand migration and remittance decisions within Bangladeshi households. 
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Remittances are an important part of the Bangladeshi economy, forming nearly 11% of 
GDP, and are the nation’s largest source of foreign exchange earnings. According to 
World Bank records, remittances to Bangladesh have experienced a boom since 2001. 
Annual remittance flows increased from 1.9 billion USD at the end of 2001 to 9.7 
billionUSD at the end of 2009, at an annual average growth rate of around 27% in the last 
eight years.  
Evidence from research on the impact of remittances on households in rural 
Bangladesh,  suggests that remittance inflows have been a strong force for poverty 
reduction and even economic growth through encouraging more productive household 
investments (Ratha(GEP), 2006; see also Hossain, 2007). On a macro level, they have 
helped Bangladesh maintain current account surplus despite trade deficits. Remittances 
also exceed net earnings form exports and official development assistance, and are 
therefore the primary source of foreign exchange reserves (Siddiqui, 2006). 
 The large flow of remittances to Bangladesh is a result of large scale labor 
exportation from Bangladesh into the low-skilled job sectors of mainly the Middle East 
and Southeast Asia. Research shows that most of the remittances to Bangladesh comes 
from labor migrants rather than from the diaspora (Hussain, 2009; see also Siddiqui, 
2004a). The presence of extensive remittances implies that Bangladeshi migrants 
maintain a strong link, whether emotional, contractual, or both, with their origin 
households.  
  
In this study, we are concerned with what inspires these transfers of resources, 
and generally predict, according to the findings of Lucas and Stark (1985) that there 
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exists a mixture of motives with pure self-interest, and pure altruism as extremes.  The 
objective of this study is to develop a suitable model that will allow us to test predictions 
associated with the mutually beneficial contract model of remittances as well as altruism 
and self-interest using data from households in Mirzapur, Bangladesh.  
Setting 
 Bangladesh is a developing country in South Asian with a population of 
160,000,128 in 2008 (World Bank country profile), the seventh-highest population in the 
world, and a population density of 2917.6 people per square mile. It has a poverty 
headcount ratio of 40% dereasing from almost 50% in 2003, and a literacy rate of 55%. 
The life expectancy age at birth is 66 years old. (World Bank Country Profile). The gross 
domestic product (GDP) in 2009 was 79,554 million USD, and the real GDP growth rate 
is estimated to be 5.7% in 2009 (CIA World Factbook, 2010 and World Bank Country 
Profile). The GDP per capita income is $497, compared to the world average of $10,200. 
The service sector contributed more than half of the national GDP, followed by industry 
and then agriculture, although nearly two-thirds of the populations is employed in 
agriculture, and only around one-quarter of the population is employed in the service 
sector.  
 Bangladesh’s total exports and services amounted to 13.97 billion USD, and make 
up 20.3% of the GDP. These exports flow mainly to USA, Germany, UK, France and 
Netherlands. The main exports are mainly ready-made garments, even though the 
agricultural sector employs more of the population than the service industry. Besides 
garments, Bangladesh also exports frozen fish, jute, leather and tea. Gross revenue from 
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garments exports, 12.3 billion USD in 2009, ranks as the highest foreign exchange 
earnings for Bangladesh, however, when we account for costs of raw materials, then the 
earnings from remittances, 9.7 billion USD in 2009. contribute even more to foreign 
exchange earnings than net earnings from garment (Siddiqui, 2006). Bangladesh 
imported an estimated value of 20.22 billion USD in 2009, mainly in machinery and 
equipment, chemicals, iron and steel, textiles, foodstuffs, petroleum products and cement. 
(Information taken from CIA World Factbook, 2010) 
 Bangladesh has a  migration rate of -2.53 persons per 1000 people, with an 
estimated total of 4 million Bangladeshis living and working abroad. Most Bangladeshi 
emigrants from Bangladesh move to the Middle East and Southeast Asia in search of 
low-skilled jobs. There is another distinctive flow of Bangladeshis to the United States, 
however this flow is smaller and composed of long-term and usually highl-skilled 
professionals. 
 Much of the population of Bangladesh lives in rural areas. Rural Bangladesh is 
largely characterized by agriculture. Literacy rates, especially among females, are much 
lower in rural areas. Bangladesh has seven main divisions, and 64 districts. Our study 
was conducted in the Mirzapur subdistrict of Tangail district. The Tangail district lies in 
the central region of Bangladesh and is a part of the Dhaka division, which also 
incorporates the capital city, Dhaka. Tangail has a population of about 3.2 million, with a 
population density of 2461.1 people per square mile which is slightly less than 
Bangladesh. The average literacy rate in Tangail is much lower than the rest of 
Bangladesh, at  a meager 29.6% with male literacy rates being 36.1% and female 
literacyrate being 22.4%. Agriculture is Tangail’s main industry, and employs around 
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49.53% of the population, followed by agricultural labor, commerce, service, wage labor, 
transport, and industry. It has a surface area of 3,414.39 km², and and 3, 386.53km2 of it 
is cultivable land.  Almost 50% of the cultivable land is used to grow two crops at a time, 
while 31% of the land is used for three crops at a time, and 19% is used to grow single 
crop. Also, 60% of the land in Tangail is irrigated. The main crops grown are rice, jute, 
sugarcane, wheat, mustard seed and pulse. (Information taken from Banglapedia) 
Besides land crops, Tangail also produces fruits such as mangos, jackfruit, 
bananas, lychees, and pineapples. Tangail also has a renowned textiles and weaving 
industry, as it is the home of the “ Tangail sareee” a material woven from both cotton and 
silk in beautiful patterns. Tangail sarees are one of the most famous forms of saree in 
Bangladesh.  
 Tangail’s mainl exports are jute, pineapple, banana, sugarcane and saree. 
(Information taken from Banglapedia) 
 Tangail is divided into 12 subdistricts, one of which is Mirzapur, the area 
of our study. There is very little data at the subdistrict level however we will refer to 
ICDDR,B’s baseline data for Mirzapur. Mirzapur is also a rural area, like the rest of 
Tangail, with most of its population employed in agriculture, or dependent on subsistent 
agriculture. It has a total area of 373.89km2. ICDDR,B reports a sample area of 224km2 
with a population of 253, 759 and a population density of 1133/km2 (2905 people per 
square mile) which is higher than the average population density of Mirzapur, and very 
similar to the average population density in Bangladesh. The migration situation in 
Mirzapur is similar to the rest of Bangladesh, with almost 40% of households reporting at 
least one migrant family member. Migrants from Mirzapur also most frequently move to 
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the Middle East, and Southeast Asia (ICDDR,B baseline database: See Appendix G). 
Given this large population of migrants, and a fairly high tendency of labor out-
migration, Mirzapur offers a good setting to study remittances.  
 
Tangail, Bangladesh (taken from Prime Minister’s Office Library, Bangladesh 
government.) 
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Mirzapur, Tangail (taken from Prime Minister’s Office Library, Bangladesh 
government.) 
 
  
2.2 Data 
The data for this study are from a 2009 field study conducted in 5 villages of 
Mirzapur sub-district of Bangladesh. The surveys were carried out in 500 households in 
five small villages of Mirzapur, Tangail. Tangail In the context of rural dwellings, we 
defined households as people who eat daily meals together, and usually share resources 
for meals.   
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The survey contains detailed information on household demographics, livelihood 
and possessions, as well as some information about relatives living abroad, their ties, and 
money sending behaviors. In this survey we addressed the following questions:  
(1) What household level factors affect the likelihood of households receiving 
remittances. 
(2) What migrant characteristics affect the likelihood of households receiving 
remittances. 
 
The survey was conducted over the period of two months in 2009. As such, the 
survey is not a time-series or longitudinal study, nor does it compare data across two 
locations, as a cross-section study would. Our dataset uses one-time data collected from 
500 randomly selected households.  
In the next section, we will provide a summary of a few key features of the 
households and migrants in our sample. We will also briefly look at how households 
choose to utilize remittances. 
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     Descriptive Statistics 
    Variable 
 
# observations Min Max 
Household 
    Size of Household (mean) 4.48 500 1 16 
Age of Household Head (years, mean) 45.564 500 17 125 
Female head of household (%)  18 
   Number of Females in Household (mean) 1.858 500 0 9 
Age of household members: 
    Level of Education of Head of Household(%) 
    No formal education 43.1 215 
  Primary education or lower 44.1 220 
  Completed up to secondary education  6.4 32 
   Higher than secondary education 6.01 30 
  Household wealth and dwelling: 
    Household Income (Taka, mean) 6370.759 411 41 40001 
Per Capita Income (Taka, mean) 1464.825 411 20.5 10000 
Common types of Occupation for household heads (%): 
    Small business/store owner 35.8 
   Daily laborer 17.8 
   Produce Sale 14.7 
   Number of Rooms in House (mean) 2.498 500 1 9 
Estimated floor area (decimile, mean) 10.73096 499 0.5 65 
Durables: 
     Number of Fans per household (mean) 1.980822 365 1 9 
Number of Tvs per household (mean) 1.057269 227 1 3 
Number of Fridges per household (mean) 1 39 1 1 
Number of durables in a household (mean) 0.424 500 0 11 
Size of Land owned (decimile, mean) 100.2333 255 1.5 896 
Number of animals/livestock owned 3.954 500 0 27 
     Families with international migrants (%) 65 325 
  
     Migrants: 
    Number of International Migrants in a household 
(mean) 0.932 500 0 5 
Age of Interntational Migrants (years, mean) 31.41957 460 14 65 
Years Abroad (years, mean) 5.177106 460 1 30 
Number of emigrants that are related to the household 
head as (%): 
    son  31.6 
   Brother 19.1 
   household young 39.5 
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2.2.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
A. Household Demographics 
Household characteristics and the household head:  
Of the 500 households surveyed, the mean household size was 4.5people per 
household, with a maximum of 16 people in a household. A majority of the households 
(82%) had male head of households indicating the presence of a strong patriarchal 
structure.  However the total number of females and males in a household are roughly 
equal with an average proportion estimate of 1.09. 
The average age of household heads was 45.6 years, with male head of 
households being slightly older than the average with a mean age of 46.8 years, and the 
Spouse 10.7 
   Son in law 6.2 
   Number of emigrants in regions: 
    Middle east 56.2 360 
  Southeast Asia 13.3 85 
  All other regions: Europe, North America, South 
America, Central America,  Australia, etc. 3.1 20 
  
     Cost of emigration of all emigrants (Taka, mean) 322183.8 321 40000 2110000 
Percent of households with migrants that contributed 
in migration expenses 56.7 182 
  Education of Emigrants (%): 
    No formal education 10.3 
   Primary education or less 43.4 
   Secondary education or higher 18 
   
     Occupation of Emigrants (%) : 
    Labor 90.4 416 
  Service 9.7 45 
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female heads being much younger with a mean age of 40.7years. Only 13.8% of 
household heads are above the age of 65, while 15.8% of household heads are 30 years or 
younger. Most household heads (52.6%) are between the age of 25 and 45 years of age. A 
small portion of the sample households were Hindu, however almost 90% of households 
interviewed are Muslim.  
 
The level of education in rural areas of Bangladesh  is generally very low, and this 
is reflected in our sample. Very few household heads are educated beyond primary 
schooling. A large proportion of household heads have had no formal schooling (43.1%), 
and 44% of household heads are just literate.  Only 12.4% of household heads have 
completed secondary schooling or continued on with studies beyond secondary 
schooling. This trend of few educated household heads is almost identical across male 
and female heads, however, proportionally, fewer female heads are illiterate in this 
sample (36.7%).   
 Similarly, the average ratio of literate members to illiterate members in the entire 
household, accounting for young members who have not yet been schooled, is slightly 
lower than one (.98) so households mostly have as many, if not more members without 
formal education than those with any form of formal education. 
 
B. Household wealth   
Occupation types: 
Most household heads are also income earners, and are predominantly, in order of 
frequency, small business owners (or store owners), daily laborers, farmers, and company 
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workers (i.e. working in floor management positions in factories). In general, people 
employed as small business owners (i.e. owners of small stalls in the nearest marker), 
large business owners (i.e. owner of actual shops, pharmacies, contractor companies etc.), 
medical Workers, company workers, farmers, and fishermen earned higher than the 
average incomes. Whereas, daily laborers, farm laborers, garments workers, storekeepers 
(or salesmen), rickshaw pullers, and pension recipients generally received lower than the 
mean level of monthly income.  
 
Number of Income earners: 
 The mean number of income earners is 1.06, thus most households (63.8%) have 
just one income earner. The highest number of income earners in a household is 4, and 
17.6%  have no income earners at all. Most of the households with no income earners 
(67%) are female-headed. Also, interestingly , all of the households with no income 
earners have at least one domestic or international migrant, with almost 90% of them 
having international migrants. Similarly, all but one of the households with no income 
earners reported receiving some form of remittances from migrant family members.  
 
 
Household income: 
 Excluding the households reporting zero income earners and thus zero monthly 
income, the mean monthly income for households in our sample was 6371TK (excluding 
remittances.) The average monthly per capita income in our sample was 1465TK, or $21 
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per month. This is significantly lower than the per capita income estimates for all of 
Bangladesh ($125 per month).  
 
Possessions: Land, Pond and Livestock 
Ownership of land is quite varied in our sample. A little over half of the 
household (51.1%) own some form of land (other than land of current dwelling), and half 
without any land ownership (49.1%). Land is primarily used for subsistence agriculture 
(almost 75% of all land owned), weakly followed by land used to grow crops for sale 
(11.8%) and then land purchased to build family dwelling and land used to rent to other 
families for use (both below 7%). Some of the better-off families (32.5% of those who 
own land) also employ other families to work on their land. 
  
 Less than a quarter of the households own ponds. Most households also own 
livestock for subsistence and income. Cows and Chickens are the most commonly owned 
animals, followed by ducks. Animals are primarily used for meat and dairy for purposes 
of subsistence, with also significant commercial usage of animals for sale of dairy and 
meat products in local markets.  
 
Dwelling: 
 Almost all households own their own home (95.2%) which is not a significant 
finding, given that there is not a strong presence of hierarchal system of land ownership, 
where few households own most of the land on which the rest of the households live as 
tenants. The size of the dwellings are more varied, with an average of 2.5 rooms per 
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household, and 10.7 “decimal” area. A significant portion (~30%) of the households is 
single-room dwellings.  The type of floor and fencing material are also informative in 
terms of household wealth. 83% of households us earth as their flooring material, 
whereas 17% use cement, the more expensive material. In general, households with 
cement foundation tend to have higher incomes. Tin was the predominant fencing 
material (90.8%), with a few households (5%) with cement fencing and just one 
household in our sample with brick fencing. From local prices, we hold that, besides 
earth, tin is the least expensive and most widely available fencing material. Cement and 
brick are far more expensive, with brick being the more expensive material.  
 
Amenities: 
 Most households (73%) own fans, and the average number of fans is 1.98 per 
household, with the maximum number of fans being as high as 9 in one household. Many 
households also own televisions (45.4%), however, they are not as common as fans. 
Furthermore, most households own just one TV, and the highest number of TVs owned is 
3 by just one household. Very few households own refrigerators (8%) and no household 
owns more than one. Also, all the households that own refrigerators also own at least one 
TV as well as fan. Most households that own at least one type of the three types of 
amenities,  own fan and TV together (37.2%), followed closely by households that own 
just one type of amenity (28%) which is fans with just one exception. It should be noted 
however that 26.8% of households own no amenities.  
 
Number of Income Earners 
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The maximum number of income earners in a household was 4, with a minimum 
of 0. Of the 500 households surveyed, 88 households had no income earners (17.6%), 
most households (63.8%) had only one income earner and 13.8% of households had two 
income earners. Of the 88 households with no local income earners, all have migrant 
family members and 78 of these households cite that remittances from migrants are 
crucial to their livelihood. All 88 households cite that remittances are at least at times 
helpful.  A total of 79 of 88 households (89.8%) with no local income have at least one 
international migrant, while only 9 have domestic migrants only.  Thus all of the 
households with no income have migrants, and  a large majority  of them have 
international migrants. This suggests that international remittance could be a crucial 
source of income for very low income households.  
 
Eid sacrifice 
Of the Muslim households in our sample, only 27.1% had done Eid sacrifice in 
the past year.  Indicating a small proportion of muslim households had dispensable 
income in the past year. Of the households that sacrificed, most households sacrificed 
cows. We recorded the color of the animals sacrificed and used local market information 
based on prices according to color to see how much dispensable income a household has. 
This question only pertains to sacrifices made in the previous year and we use it to see 
the impacts of remittances.    
 
C. Migrants 
Sex, Age and Education: 
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Most households in our sample (91.4%) have migrant family members (including 
domestic migrants.) However most domestic migrants are females who leave home to 
stay with their husbands after marriage. For this paper we are concerned with 
international migrants. 65% of households in our sample have at least one international 
migrant. International migrants are almost exclusively male in our sample (with the 
exception of four females), and are quite young. The average age of foreign migrants is 
31.4years, with the maximum age being 65. The average number of years abroad for 
international migrants from our sample households is 4.98years, with a maximum of 30 
years abroad.  
  Most migrants are literate, however a large number of migrants (43.4%)  have 
only completed primary schooling or less. A small portion of migrants (18%) however 
have completed secondary education and beyond, while a tiny group of migrants (3.7%) 
have completed either graduate (Bachelors) or Post-Graduate (Masters) education.   
  
Destination region: 
Most international migrants (56.2%) move to the Middle East,  followed by 
nations in Southeast Asia, such as Singapore and Malaysia (see Appendix B). Overall, 
only 7 migrants in our sample moved to Western nations. This is likely due to the 
increased transportation costs due to distance, lack of resources and ability to solicit jobs 
from such a great distance, lack of skills for western job markets, and/ or the absence of 
related migrants, who generally prove crucial to helping family members settle and attain 
jobs in foreign countries. Migrants from Mirzapur are largely low-skilled. Most from our 
sample (89.8%) work as daily laborers in foreign countries, weakly followed by (6.7%) 
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of all migrants working in blue-collar company positions, for example, as factory 
managers.  Almost all of the migrants in Middle East (91.7%) are employed as daily 
laborers.  
 
Relationship to Household Head: 
A large portion of emigrants are related as sons to the household head (31.5%) , 19.1% 
are related as brothers, 16.3% are related as brothers-in-law, 10.7% are related as 
husband, and 6.2% are related as sons-in-law. 
 The survey misses a key variable, the marital status of emigrants, which would 
have provided an informative tool for studying the loyalties of migrants who are married, 
and whether they remit more to a household which contains their spouse. However, using 
the relationship status with reference to the household head (such as husband, wife, 
daughter-in-law and son-in-law)  we can at least determine to some extent whether 
marital status impacts loyalties and likelihood of remitting. 
 
 
D. Utilization of Remittances 
  We constructed a ranking variable to determine how households most commonly 
utilized remittances. A rank of 1 indicates that most of the monetary amount of 
remittances is utilized for that purpose, and so on.  By looking at what uses of remittances 
are ranked as 1, we find that most households use most of their received remittances to 
repay loans taken out to cover the costs of migration (34.1%). However, a significant 
amount of households (27.2%), also reported to using most of their remittances to fund 
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general daily consumption needs such as food and clothing.  For a smaller number of 
households, most of the remittances also come in as gifts for family events such as 
weddings and births (8.5%), to fund, to fund the construction of house for dwelling 
(6.6%), and for health emergencies(5.9). However, purposes such as daily consumption, 
health-related payments and education costs are more commonly cited as the purposes for 
which the second or third largest portion of remittances are used. A general survey of the 
rank variables indicate that these households commonly use remittances for loan 
repayment, daily consumption, gifts for family events, health treatments payments, 
financing education of children, building family home, and maintaining land.  
 Notably, only two households cited using remitted money to recover from natural 
disasters, as Mirzapur, unlike other areas of Bangladesh, is not a common site for severe 
flooding, hurricanes or cyclones.  It was also evident that at least some households did 
use remittances to fund progressive investments in their financial future by spending the 
money on education, maintaining land on which crops are grown for sale, savings, 
starting and maintaining businesses, migration of other family members. However, the 
number of households that prioritized the spending of remittances on daily food, medical 
or loan repayment needs (i.e. non income-generating or human-capital building purposes) 
is much greater. 
 
2.3 Our Model 
 
   The survey contains data on 500 households and 460 international and 615 
domestic migrants, however for our study we are mainly concerned with foreign 
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migrants.  Of all the households surveyed, 325 (65%) households had at least one 
international migrant. Thus in our sample, we can find variations between both the 
reception of remittances and the amount of remittances.  Thus we construct two separate 
models, the first models the likelihood that a household receives remittances from abroad 
(a binary variable), while the second models the perceived importance of received 
remittances, which is a proxy for the amount of remittances sent. Our survey does not 
directly ask for the amount of remittances the household receives, thus we must assume 
that the perceived importance of the remittances to the welfare and operation of the 
household correlates positively with the amount of  remittances relative to the household 
income (if any). So we accept that if household members cite remittances as crucial to the 
welfare of their household, it implies that the amount of remittances makes up a 
significant portion (if not all) of the household's income.   
  
The model to determine the likelihood of a household receiving remittances can 
be shown simply as: 
Ri = Zix + ui  
Where Ri is a binary variable that equals to 1 if the ith household receives remittances 
from abroad, and equals to 0 if the household does not receive foreign remittances. Zi is a 
set of regressor variables that we introduce below. X denotes the set of parameters that 
correspond to the regressor variables, and ui is the error term. We use a probit model to 
estimate this equation. 
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The model to determine the importance (amount of remittances) can be 
represented as: 
Ai = Xiy + ei 
Where Ai has five possible values where 1 equals "not important", 2 equals "at times 
helpful", 3 equals "helpful", 4 equals "very helpful", 5 equals "not crucial".  X refers to 
the vector of parameter estimates,  Xi is a slightly different set of explanatory variables, 
and ei is the error term. For this equation we can use ordinary least square regression.  
 
The surveys we conducted contain information from the migrant-sending 
household in the origin country regarding household demographics, income, and other 
forms of wealth as well as some primitive migrant characteristic information. In this 
study, we will try to determine the factors that impact the likelihood and extent of 
remittances both from the perspective of the household as well as the shadow migrants. 
Although we have individual characteristics of migrants in our survey, we do not 
however know from which migrant family member the household receives remittances 
from. We will instead try to derive a slightly weaker indicator of who is remitting by 
looking at migrant characteristics that are commonly featured in households that receive 
remittances.  
  
Thus we have four sets of models, two of which belong to the household 
perspective, and two of which belong to the migrant perspective. Within these separate 
perspectives, we also have two different models, one of which focuses on determining 
what factors impact the likelihood of a household receiving remittances, and another 
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focused on determining factors that affect the perceived importance  (or relative size) of 
remittances.  
  
2.4 Variables and Theory 
 
We employ nested regressions in order to determine the added power of 
estimation due to an added layer of regressor variables. We are using a nested regression 
model similar to Cai (2003) in his study on determining the factors that impact the 
amount of remittances in urban-rural remittance transfers in China. Similar to our study, 
Cai also investigates the possible impact of family ties on remittance amount, and a 
layered regression method is helpful for detecting the relevance of an added group of 
family ties variables. As our study looks at a lot of similar variables, including family 
ties, as Cai’s study, we also use nested regressions to test our models. 
  In our models, both the likelihood of receiving (or sending) remittances (Ri) as 
well as the relative amount or importance of remittances (Ai) are treated as a function of 
four groups of variables: migrant characteristics, household demographics, household 
wealth, and family ties. However, the component variables within these overall groups of 
variables differ slightly between the equations for the two dependent variables.  
List of Variable names 
mig_age Age of Migrant 
mig_ag~q Age of Migrant squared 
non_im~u* No formal education (migrant) 
lit_im~u* Elementary education or lower (migrant) 
high_~du* College education or higher (migrant) 
yrs_ab~d Number of years abroad  
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Migrant Characteristics 
yrs_ab~q Number of years abroad squared 
labor_~u* Labor occupation (migrant) 
servic~u* Service occupation (migrant) 
famsize Size of non-migrant (NM) household 
num_son Number of sons of household head 
num_mi~a Number of migrants from household 
fem_hh Number of female members in NM household 
d_in_law* Number of daughters-in-law of household head in NM household 
grandc~d Number of grandchildren of household head in NM household 
edu_non Number of members in NM household with no formal education 
edu_high* Number of members in NM household with college education or higher 
some_c~e* = 1 if NM household made some contribution to migrant expenses 
high_cont = 1 if NM household made high (more than ¾ ) contribution to migrant 
expenses 
visi~2yr Number of migrants from NM household who visit more than once every 
two years 
Visi_less5 Number of migrants from NM household who visit less than once every 
five years 
son_mig* = 1if NM household head as at least one son migrant 
son_int_mig Number of migrant sons of NM household head 
bro_mig* = 1if migrant is brother of NM household head 
bro_int_mig Number of migrant brothers of NM household head 
spouse~g* =1 if migrant is spouse of NM household head 
spouse_int_mig Number of migrant spouses of NM household head 
second~g* = 1 if migrant is a secondary (in-laws, etc.) relative of NM household 
head 
second_int_mig Number of secondarily related migrants of NM household head 
logper~e Log of per capita income of NM household 
HH_Inc Number of income earners in NM household 
log_l~19 Log of size of land owned by NM household 
own_li~k* =1 if NM household owns livestock 
no_ame~s* =1 if NM household owns no amenities 
fantv* =1 if NM household owns one or more fans AND TV 
all_am~s* =1 if NM household owns one or mote fans, TV and refrigerator 
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The unrestricted model regresses each dependent variable against the 
characteristics of the migrant such as age, education, occupation, and number of years 
abroad. We do not include a gender  variable because, except for four migrants, all of the 
migrants in our sample are male. We also do not include a variable for purpose of 
migration, because the data on this question reveals that international migrants are 
invariantly migrating in search of employment. We do not have information on migrant 
income, however, we use a human capital model construction to deduce the experience, 
skill and hence possible wage level of each migrant using his education and number of 
years in destination country. We also can use his occupation to deduce income level, 
however, almost all migrants are employed in low-skilled sectors in host countries, 
therefore the change in income level due to different occupation types is not clear.  
Besides serving as an indicator for the migrant’s earning potential, the migrant’s 
education level can also serve as a measure of the household’s investment in the migrant 
that is particularly meaningful in the context of the family contract model. Lucas and 
Stark (1985) hypothesize that a higher level of education should correlate to a greater 
likelihood of remitting, and also higher level of remittances as a way to repay the 
household for their investment. However, a positive relationship between larger 
remittances and level of education could simply be a reflection of the higher wages 
afforded by higher levels of education, and a positive relationship between higher income 
and remittances is compatible with altruism. To account for this, Lucas and Stark also 
include a variable that indicates whether a migrant has grown up in the household 
(household young – sons, niece, nephew, grandchildren) thus increasing the probability 
that their education was heavily invested in by the household. Therefore, if at a certain 
56 
 
level of education, household young remit more than other family members, then we can 
better conclude that this greater level of remittances reflects repayment for the investment 
made by the household, and thus the family contract model is operational. In our survey, 
we have included variables to indicate whether a migrant is the son or secondary family 
member of the household head.  
 According to the altruistic model, higher migrant income should increase the 
amount of money remitted.  This would predict a positive correlation between remittance 
sending (or receiving by the household) and migrant education level and the number of 
years abroad. However, as the times abroad increases, family ties may weaken, which 
according to the altruistic model, gradually decreases the level of remittances. The 
contract model on the other hand predicts that remittance levels should remain stable as 
long as the contract is functional, regardless of time abroad, and then suddenly drop 
altogether, should the contract expires as the migrant decides to settle permanently in the 
destination region (Dalen, Groenewold and Fokkema, 2005). The temporary or 
permanent nature of migration or the intention of the migrant to settle in abroad is a 
significant factor that determines whether the migrant will remit (Cai, 2003; Dalen, 
Groenewold and Fokkema, 2005). 
 
 
Household Characteristics 
 In our second regression, we expand our model by accounting for variables that 
reflect the composition and structure of the household. These variables are the household 
size, number of females in household, level of education among household members, 
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number of sons, the number of international migrants, and the presence of certain 
household members such as daughters-in-law and grandchildren of the household head.  
 
A large portion of migrants in our sample are related as sons to the household 
head in the country of origin, thus the presence of daughters-in-law or grandchild 
increases the likelihood of the migrant’s immediate dependents being a part of the 
household. Altruism holds that the utility of the individual will be dependent on the 
consumption level of family members who live in the home country. The presence of the 
migrant’s spouse or child in a particular household is therefore likely to increase the 
likelihood and amount of remittances to that household, because stronger family ties 
likely result in a stronger dependency of the migrant utility on the well-being of his 
dependents. Self-interest or coinsurance contract model would predict that the coefficient 
on wife and child variables would be insignificant as the migrant’s wife and child are less 
likely to offer the migrant financial support to build up his human capital or cover 
transportation costs, or provide much inheritance potential. Though it is possible that the 
wives are also income earners, therefore the altruistic motivation to remit to maintain 
consumption level of family members is weaker with wives than children. A drawback of 
our survey is that the daughter-in-law or grandchild variables are not specific to migrants, 
and therefore they could be wives and children of any other son living at home or in 
another part of Bangladesh. 
 Altruism also predicts that the number of migrants should have a significantly 
negative coefficient because a household with more migrants is likely to receive more 
remittances, thus the migrant feels less individually responsible for the well-being of the 
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household. The mutual contract and self-interest model predicts instead that the presence 
of other migrants from that household should not cause any significant change to 
remittance payments if the remittances are meant to serve as insurance for the receiving 
household (Agarwal and Horowitz, 2002). For example, a migrant who is in a mutual 
contract with his family members should not change his remittance behavior if another 
member from that family migrates as well. On the other hand, altruism predicts that the 
number of sons will have no significant impact on remittances, while both self-interest 
and family-contract model predict that more sons in a household would encourage more 
remittance sending as each son tries to improve his own chances of inheritance 
(Hoddinott, 1994). If a household has only one son, then the threat of disinheritance or 
reduced inheritance is not as serious. However, this effect will be most pronounced for 
households with inheritable possessions such as land and livestock.  
The size of household and the number of females in a household are two 
indicators of the  of dependents in a household The number of females is a more precise 
indicator of the number of dependents, as household size may also include income 
earning members.  Altruism predicts that remittances will rise with the number of 
dependants as a household with more dependents is more likely to require financial 
support (Hoddinott, 1994).  
 
 
Family ties 
We further restrict our model to control for the impact of family ties on 
remittances. In his study on rural-urban migrant-family ties in China, Cai(2003) assumes 
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that family ties are expressed through both “emotional closeness and economic 
connections”. Families exhibit economic ties by offering financial support in the initial 
stages of migration, such as with traveling costs and living costs during the job search 
period. To capture some of this effect, we use a variable amount_contrib which indicates 
the proportion of migration costs covered by family members. The variable includes zero 
proportion, or no contribution, so that it also provides information on whether a family 
con tributes to the migration expenses of migrant family members.  
 Emotional closeness between the migrant and household is measured in our 
survey through the frequency of home visits. We use two variables, one of which equals 
to one if the migrant visits more than once every two years, and the other equals to one if 
the migrant visits less than once every five years.  
 Altruism predicts that stronger family ties, exhibited through emotional or 
economic connections, should increase the dependency of the migrant’s utility on the 
household’s utility, thus the migrant will be likely to remit even more. However, the 
increase of remittances with increased family ties is not contradictory to the predictions 
of self-interest or mutually beneficial contract models, as a mutual contract is often based 
on the family’s initial economic investments in the migrant for which the migrant repays 
them using remittances (which can also be stated as one of the self-interest component of 
the mutually beneficial contract). Thus stronger economic connection, or larger economic 
participation by the family in the migrant’s migration expenses, should lead to more 
remittances to repay for the investments. We have also previously stated that the mutual 
contract, in order to be self-enforcing, must have some altruistic motivations as well, thus 
stronger family ties and more emotional attachment may actually make the contract more 
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binding. Even a migrant who is remitting to secure his own interests is likely to be 
encouraged to maintain strong family ties to ensure that his property in the home region 
is being well-maintained, or that he is in a good position to inherit, etc.  
 In order to make a distinction, we follow Lucas and Stark’s method of including 
variables based on the relationship of the migrant to the household head. We use 
variables to indicate whether the migrant is the son, spouse, brother or secondary family 
member of the household head. It is very likely that sons receive a significant amount of 
financial support during migration as well as human capital investment. The spouse on 
the other hand has strong emotional connections to the household, but it is unlikely that 
the household invested in the spouse’s education, or skills training. Both son and spouse 
(all of which are male in our sample) generally face strong expectations from the 
household to offer financial support, however the son is more likely to inherit, and also 
usually receives more investment in human capital and migration. Thus the difference 
between their tendencies to remit should indicate whether altruism is the predominant 
motivation, in which case the spouse should  be at least as likely as the son to remit, or if 
there is a mutually beneficial contract characterized by some self-interest, in which case 
the son should remit more. We use secondary family members to further check what 
happens in the absence of strong family ties and most likely economic investments.   
 
 
Household wealth 
  Finally we restrict our model to see the impact of household wealth variables on 
our two dependent variables Ri and Ai. The household wealth variables are log of per-
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capita income, number of (local) income earners, log of size of land owned, ownership of 
livestock, and ownership of  NO/one, two, or three types of durable amenities (fan, TV, 
refrigerator). The land and livestock variables all indicate the earning potential of the 
household, as well as incentives for inheritance for migrant relatives. The per-capita 
income and amenities variables also indicate how well-off the household is. There is a 
danger of reverse causation with the amenities variables, and for that matter all 
possession variables, for our survey has no way of discerning whether their possession is 
a result of remittances or whether they are a part of household wealth that existed 
independently of  remittances and possibly helped to support migration. 
 Regressions [shown in Appendix C] of ownership of amenities, livestock, land 
and size of land against presence of migrants and number of migrants, while controlling 
for household income, family size and number of income earners show that the presence 
of migrants significantly explains the possession of amenities, livestock and land. The 
effect is not as significant on the size of land owned, instead family size seems to 
strongly increase the size of land owned. Yet a survey of numbers of years of land 
possession and number of years migrants have been abroad seem to show that for the 
most part, most households owned their land prior to migration of family members. For 
these reasons, the direction of causality of household wealth in our sample is dubious. 
Therefore, we have included it as the last set of variables in our nested regression 
so that it is possible to clearly see whether including this set of variables adds to the 
power of our model to explain the presence of remittances, and the importance of 
remittances. We will also divide this group into two by first including just household 
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income and commonly inheritable possessions such as land and livestock, and then 
finally the amenities.  
The response of migrant remittance patterns to the household’s ownership of 
inheritable possessions such as livestock and especially land has important theoretical 
implications. Firstly, in rural areas, land and livestock ownership serves as an indicator of 
a household’s earning potential. Thus, for a migrant remitting with altruistic intentions, a 
household’s earning potential is an important consideration and remittances would be 
negatively correlated to land and/or livestock ownership. 
On the other hand, possessions such as land and livestock may also represent 
inheritable assets for younger members of the households, including migrants. In this 
case, self-interest motivations would predict that a migrant would be more likely to remit, 
and remit in larger amounts to an asset-owning household, with the hopes of securing 
inheritance rights. Hoddinott proposes a model where households use land disinheritance 
as a bargaining tool to ensure that migrants continue remitting once they are abroad and 
enjoying their income. Thus the inheritance of land is a part of a mutual contract between 
the household and migrant , as both parties  gain  from migration, and also  it  fits the 
self-interest model, as the migrant is remitting to secure his wealth or inheritance back 
home.  Thus the more land a household owns, the more bargaining power it has and the 
more remittances that household receives. This effect is borne out in Hoddinott's 
empirical study on remittance receiving households in… 
However, this bargaining power of possessions is conditional on the migrant 
eventually intending to return, the migrant not already owning his share of land, and also, 
as previously mentioned, the migrant not being the only son in which case he has very 
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little reason to take the threat disinheritance or reduced inheritance seriously. Our survey 
unfortunately does not have a way to discern whether land ownership has already been 
bestowed on migrants, or if the migration is intended as temporary or permanent. 
However the migrants in our sample are almost exclusively low-skilled, and migrate 
mainly to work as labor in the Middle East and Southeast Asia regions. This set of 
migrant characteristics fits the profile of most temporary migrants out of Bangladesh.  
Altruism would instead predict that households with less land would receive more 
remittances, as these households require it more and thus a migrant whose utility depends 
on the utility of the household, would remit more.  
  However, it is important to consider that migration is a hefty investment, 
especially in rural areas where migrants do not receive much support from governmental 
migration or labor departments, or other labor recruiting agencies. Therefore, the positive 
relationship between family wealth (such as land) and remittances could simply be a 
reflection of the fact that under heavy costs of migration, wealthier households are able to 
send migrants and thus receive remittances,  while less wealthy households are not able 
to send family members abroad which precludes any chances of receiving remittances.   
Thus, even if most potential migrants in an area (without migration support or resources)  
would remit out of altruistic motivations, it is possible that due to general lack of access 
of low-income households to migration opportunities that only wealthier households with 
a relatively large amount of possessions are able to afford migration. Thus we will pick 
up a positive correlation between remittances and land ownership which indicates a 
family contract model or self-interest motivations for remittances. 
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However, the lack of migration out of low-wealth households can also be explained by 
self-interest or mutual contract model where parents of households without land do not 
support the migration of family members because they fear that, without land, they do not 
have enough bargaining power to secure remittances from household members once they 
are away (Hoddinott, 1994).  
 
If remittances are indeed motivated by altruism then households with lower 
incomes or less land and livestock ownership are more likely to receive remittances. 
Altruism also predicts that remittances will decrease with household income. Yet it is 
also interesting to consider that this effect could also be because families with a sufficient 
level of income, and a large number of local income earners no longer feel the need to 
pursue migration. Stark and Taylor (1986) find that households prefer to have family 
members employed in both the local economy as well as abroad (see also Hoddinott, 
1994), and migration is just one aspect of the household’s labor distribution portfolio. In 
this situation the presence of local income earners should not correlate negatively with 
the number of migrants, or decrease remittances. On the other hand, altruism seems to 
imply a negative relationship between remittances and the number of local income 
earners, as a household that earns a sufficient level of local income is less in need of 
migrant remittances.  
On the other hand, if household income is positively linked to reception of 
remittances and relative size of remittances, then we still cannot make an absolute 
prediction that self-interest is functional. This effect could also be a reflection of the large 
initial costs of migration which pose as a barrier against migration for low-income 
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households. If there is a mutual contract or self-interest motivations then we should also 
expect to see positive links between inheritable possessions, number of adult sons, and 
education of migrants who grew up in that household (household young), and remittances 
(Hoddinott, 1994; see also Lucas and Stark, 1985) 
 
Interestingly, regressions of household wealth variables against the presence of 
migrants and also the number of migrants from a household, seems to show that the 
impact of household wealth on the likelihood of having a migrant family member are not 
very statistically significant [see Appendix D].  The coefficients indicate however that 
land ownership and income are both negatively correlated to migration, meaning that 
lower income and less landed households are more likely to have migrants. A similar 
result occurs when we change the left-hand side variable to number of migrants. This 
indicates that in Mirzapur, migrants from lower income households  migrate in order to 
increase their own, and possibly the household’s, income. Our  regressions of remittance 
reception against household per-capita income will clarify whether lower income 
households also receive more remittances. 
 On the other hand, ownership of amenities seems to be positively impact the 
likelihood of having migrants however this effect is not significant. It is positively 
significant however when the number of migrants is the dependent variable. The 
conclusions from this are unclear as we would expect amenities to behave in the same 
way as household income with respect to migrants. It is possible that this positive 
relationship reflects the reverse causality previously mentioned, in which case migration 
is positively linked to a greater ownership of amenities.   
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However, the ownership of amenities is quite significantly positively correlated to 
the log of household income, even if we account for the number of income earners, 
number of migrants, and household size [see Appendix C].But, the ownership of 
amenities is a binary variable that equals to one even if a large household owns only one 
fan, thus it is not a strong indicator of household income or wealth. If we change the 
variable to all_amenities, which equals to one if a household owns at least one fan, one 
TV and one fridge (an atypically high amount of amenities for rural areas), then the 
impact of amenities and the number of migrants becomes statistically very insignificant.  
 
 
2.5 Analysis and Discussion 
Tables 1 and 2 provide the results for migrant and household level estimations  of 
the likelihood of a migrant remitting. Tables 3 and 4 provide the results for the migrant 
and household level estimations for the importance of remittances to the household. We 
use five different columns in each table to represent five nested equations, where each 
successive column adds more variables to the last equation. We add variables 
catergotrically in the following order: migrant characteristics, household demographics, 
family ties, household wealth excluding amenities and finally household wealth including 
amenities. In this section we will analyze how these sets of variables  respond in each of 
our different models, and what conclusions we can derive regarding the motivation of 
remittances, from their estimations of Ri (binary variable of the likelihood of a household 
receiving remittances) and Ai ( a variable ranging from 1 to 5, indicating the importance 
or extent of remittances).  
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Table 1 :Migrant Level 
Probit of whether International Migrants send remittances to the household 
Dependent Variable: R_abroad = 1 if international migrant sends any amount of 
remittances to household. 
 P-values in parentheses 
 
 Col A Column 
1 
Col B Column 
2 
Col C Column 
3 
Col D Column 
4 
Col E Column 
5 
Migrant 
age 
.0078249 
(0.339) 
.0079971 
(0.338) 
.0056529 
(0.39) 
.0050444 
(0.445) 
.0029512 
(0.26) 
.0028147 
(0.267) 
.0019479 
(0.942) 
.0005814 
(0.982) 
-.0005415 
(0.981) 
.0002402 
(0.991) 
Migrant 
age 
squared 
-.0001371 
(0.223) 
-
.000139 
(0.222) 
-.0000809 
(0.371) 
-.0000701 
(0.438) 
-.0000383 
(0.287) 
-.0000363 
(0.293) 
-5.28e-06 
(0.989) 
.0000302 
(0.937) 
.0000316 
(0.922) 
.0000289 
(0.928) 
No 
formal 
education 
(migrant) 
 .0024009 
(0.966) 
 -.0395635 
(0.424) 
 -.0097769 
(0.603) 
 -.4617204 
(0.122) 
 -.3904932 
(0.163) 
Just 
Literate 
(migrant) 
 .00596
59 
(0.891) 
 -.0244342 
(0.46) 
 -.0090479 
(0.439) 
 -.1284528 
(0.197) 
 -.1236076 
(0.14) 
High 
eduction 
(migrant) 
 .0020822 
(0.974) 
 .017403 
(0.715) 
 -.0159846 
(0.489) 
 -.5973141 
(0.036) 
 -.5600733 
(0.047) 
Years 
abroad 
.0204831 
(0.012) 
.0204414 
(0.012) 
.01438 
(0.024) 
.0145909 
(0.021) 
.005852 
(0.023) 
.0054642 
(0.026) 
.0227557 
(0.447) 
.0310874 
(0.307) 
.0205875 
(0.432) 
.0295215 
(0.263) 
Years 
abroad 
squared 
-.0005696 
(0.118) 
-
.0005672 
(0.12) 
-.0004331 
(0.133) 
-.0004564 
(0.109) 
-.0001953 
(0.093) 
-.0001803 
(0.107) 
-.0007738 
(0.654) 
-.0010274 
(0.549) 
-.0007724 
(0.574) 
-.0010759 
(0.416) 
Labor 
occupatio
n 
.272619 
(0.161) 
.2699717 
(0.167) 
.3890774 
(0.149) 
.3655461 
(0.169) 
.3838782 
(0.225) 
.3899716 
(0.236) 
dropped dropped  dropped 
Service 
Occupati
on 
.1302014 
(0.107) 
.1301761 
(0.11) 
.1004562 
(0.094) 
.095847 
(0.124) 
.0321816 
(0.143) 
.0304162 
(0.156) 
dropped dropped  dropped 
Family 
size 
(HH) 
  -.0084709 
(0.312) 
-.0090413 
(0.276) 
.0054695 
(0.202) 
.0048145 
(0.244) 
-.0035444 
(0.941) 
-.0102907 
(0.816) 
.0062262 
(0.884) 
-.0006551 
(0.987) 
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Number 
of sons 
(HH) 
  .0056006 
(0.692) 
.0063137 
(0.654) 
-.0107507 
(0.082) 
-.0095139 
(0.107) 
-.0816562 
(0.137) 
-.0617503 
(0.27) 
-.0780811 
(0.126) 
-.0622816 
(0.228) 
Number 
of 
migrants 
  .0353017 
(0.024) 
.0338593 
(0.028) 
.0172785 
(0.005) 
.0165352 
(0.005) 
-.0072989 
(0.902) 
.0269048 
(0.661) 
.00294 
(0.955) 
.0266461 
(0.617) 
Number 
of 
females 
in HH 
(fem_hh) 
  .0152658 
(0.175) 
.0146517 
(0.195) 
-.0042115 
(0.356) 
-.0034369 
(0.434) 
-.0312791 
(0.395) 
-.0140282 
(0.706) 
-.0319831 
(0.379) 
-.0182092 
(0.618) 
Number 
of 
daughters
-in-law 
in HH 
  .1399533 
(0.026) 
.1388337 
(0.027) 
.0330251 
(0.316) 
.0324751 
(0.311) 
.0108717 
(0.973) 
-.0981174 
(0.817) 
.0317741 
(0.91) 
-.1276047 
(0.782) 
Number 
of 
grandchil
dren in 
HH 
  .0022353 
(0.948) 
.0039376 
(0.909) 
-.0072976 
(0.626) 
-.007131 
(0.618) 
-.077201 
(0.67) 
-.0477229 
(0.794) 
-.0501963 
(0.772) 
-.0143327 
(0.937) 
No 
formal 
education 
(HH) 
  .0200923 
(0.138) 
.022333 
(0.102) 
.0038601 
(0.474) 
.0039566 
(0.449) 
-.0076675 
(0.87) 
-.003537 
(0.94) 
-.0142995 
(0.742) 
-.0079684 
(0.852) 
High 
level of 
education 
(HH) 
  -.0665708 
(0.01) 
-.0732793 
(0.005) 
-.0399119 
(0) 
-.0377801 
(0) 
-.5846395 
(0.01) 
-.6523019 
(0.01) 
-.5125579 
(0.018) 
-.5786688 
(0.014) 
Some 
HH 
contributi
on to 
migration 
costs 
    .0102905 
(0.259) 
.0098236 
(0.253) 
.0876734 
(0.268) 
.0840061 
(0.274) 
.0370355 
(0.645) 
.0510356 
(0.498) 
High HH 
contributi
on to 
migration 
costs 
    .1136269 
(0) 
.1111927 
(0) 
dropped dropped  dropped 
Visit 
once 
every 2 
years or 
more 
(migrant) 
    .0080188 
(0.368) 
.0074935 
(0.376) 
.1552508 
(0.221) 
.026532 
(0.843) 
.155416 
(0.183) 
.0397697 
(0.753) 
Visit 
once 
every 5 
years or 
less 
(migrant) 
    .0067048 
(0.722) 
.006894 
(0.699) 
dropped    
Son of 
HH head 
(migrant) 
    -.0022842 
(0.909) 
-.0034331 
(0.86) 
.1187558 
(0.302) 
.1161726 
(0.319) 
.0992495 
(0.272) 
.0973512 
(0.287) 
Brother 
of HH 
head 
(migrant) 
    -.1078505 
(0) 
-.1037779 
(0) 
-.2673622 
(0.137) 
-.1513257 
(0.389) 
-.2072897 
(0.225) 
-.0818294 
(0.6) 
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Table 2:Household Level 
Probit of whether International Migrants send remittances to the household 
Dependent Variable: R_abroad = 1 if international migrant sends any amount of 
remittances to household. 
Spouse 
of HH 
head 
(migrant) 
    .0184716 
(0.13) 
.0169666 
(0.14) 
-.4392859 
(0.358) 
-.6476278 
(0.202) 
-.367916 
(0.378) 
-.5484241 
(0.238) 
Seconda
ry 
relative 
of HH 
head 
(migrant
) 
    -.109937 
(0) 
-.1094385 
(0) 
-.492184 
(0.001) 
-.575974 
(0.001) 
-.5375767 
(0.001) 
-.622225 
(0.001) 
Log per 
capita 
income 
(HH) 
      -.1679818 
(0.009) 
-.184626 
(0.006) 
-.1471721 
(0.01) 
-.1654016 
(0.008) 
Number 
of 
income 
earners 
(HH) 
      .1219905 
(0.207) 
.1093067 
(0.27) 
.0809885 
(0.322) 
.0805891 
(0.35) 
Log of 
size of 
land 
(HH) 
      .0607949 
(0.143) 
.0437646 
(0.308) 
.04629 
(0.205) 
.0377738 
(0.313) 
Own 
livestock 
(HH) 
      .1842961 
(0.158) 
.1825461 
(0.165) 
.2198743 
(0.125) 
.1935369 
(0.15) 
No 
Amenitie
s (HH) 
        .0699164 
(0.358) 
.071386 
(0.347) 
Own fan 
and TV 
(HH) 
        .1141078 
(0.206) 
.0939897 
(0.266) 
Own all 
3 
amenities 
(fan, tv, 
fridge) 
(HH( 
        -.0219267 
(0.869) 
-.0446981 
(0.765) 
  N=458  N=458  N=458  N=99  N=99 
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 Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 
Migrant age      
Migrant age 
squared 
     
No formal 
education 
(migrant) 
-0.08015 
(0.438) 
-0.06207 
(0.578) 
.0172589 
(0.873) 
-.4760538 
(0.081) 
-.4602994 
(0.093) 
Just Literate 
(migrant) 
-0.05687 
(0.497) 
-0.07125 
(0.446) 
-.0375445 
(0.669) 
-.1140301 
(0.593) 
-.120514 
(0.573) 
High 
eduction 
(migrant) 
-0.11907 
(0.352) 
-0.06961 
(0.62) 
-.0775148 
(0.551) 
-.3719214 
(0.027) 
-.373132 
(0.028) 
Years abroad      
Years abroad 
squared 
     
Labor 
occupation 
0.712285 
(0) 
0.822459 
(0) 
.6882887 
(0.019) 
.6804109 
(0.005) 
.6834746 
(0.005) 
Service 
Occupation 
0.918615 
(0) 
1.141548 
(0) 
1.029685 
(0.003) 
  
Family size 
(HH) 
 -0.05254 
(0.014) 
-.0007276 
(0.978) 
-.1126909 
(0.14) 
-.1184628 
(0.13) 
Number of 
sons 
(HH) 
 0.06921 
(0.064) 
-.0359382 
(0.376) 
-.0137531 
(0.893) 
-.0007832 
(0.994) 
Number of 
migrants 
 -0.12217 
(0.537) 
-.2820115 
(0.353) 
  
Number of 
females in 
HH 
(fem_hh) 
 0.0685 
(0.023) 
-.0074108 
(0.798) 
.0058733 
(0.933) 
.0138989 
(0.849) 
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Number of 
daughters-in-
law in HH 
 0.209643 
(0.032) 
.2043931 
(0.081) 
.5484961 
(0.048) 
.5553967 
(0.047) 
Number of 
grandchildren 
in HH 
 0.076956 
(0.276) 
-.0237659 
(0.779) 
-.1107149 
(0.583) 
-.1120937 
(0.586) 
No formal 
education 
(HH) 
 -0.0232 
(0.447) 
-.0258768 
(0.393) 
-.0311508 
(0.68) 
-.0243745 
(0.753) 
High level of 
education 
(HH) 
 -0.16606 
(0.027) 
-.1405327 
(0.036) 
-.0474943 
(0.721) 
-.0503095 
(0.718) 
Some HH 
contribution 
to migration 
costs 
  .1339933 
(0.035) 
.1948301 
(0.183) 
.1792968 
(0.245) 
High HH 
contribution 
to migration 
costs 
  .4400668 
(0) 
Dropped dropped 
Visit once 
every 2 years 
or more 
(migrant) 
  .0339647 
(0.649) 
.0905803 
(0.664) 
.1002788 
(0.644) 
Visit once 
every 5 years 
or less 
(migrant) 
  .159837 
(0.376) 
Dropped Dropped  
Son of HH 
head 
(migrant) 
  .0815179 
(0.463) 
.1397229 
(0.503) 
.1399193 
(0.52) 
Brother of 
HH head 
(migrant) 
  .0136635 
(0.836) 
.2830572 
(0.127) 
.2730731 
(0.148) 
Spouse of 
HH head 
(migrant) 
  .2686368 
(0) 
-.0745739 
(0.843) 
-.078741 
(0.836) 
Secondary 
relative of 
HH head 
  .1997553 .4221329 .4162453 
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(migrant) (0.018) (0.034) (0.037) 
Log per 
capita 
income 
(HH) 
   -.1352137 
(0.156) 
-.1343679 
(0.195) 
Number of 
income 
earners 
(HH) 
   .0324031 
(0.807) 
.0264859 
(0.843) 
Log of size 
of land 
(HH) 
   .0282965 
(0.685) 
.0227299 
(0.749) 
Own 
livestock 
(HH) 
   .1797355 
(0.196) 
.183321 
(0.193) 
No 
Amenities 
(HH) 
    -.0422905 
(0.805) 
Own fan and 
TV (HH) 
    .0324799 
(0.853) 
Own all 3 
amenities 
(fan, tv, 
fridge) 
(HH) 
    -.0117451 
(0.965) 
 N=500 N=500 N=500 N=130 N=130 
 
 
 
 
73 
 
Table 1 shows the results of probit models used to estimate the likelihood of a 
household receiving remittances  from abroad. Column 1 looks at the likelihood of an 
international migrant remitting (Ri) solely as a function of migrant characteristics. One of 
the predictions of the self-interest model for migration is that the decision to migrate and 
remit can all be explained using migrant characteristics. Agarwal and Horowitz (2002) 
developed two sets of models to determine whether remittances to Guyana more closely 
modeled by pure self-interest (characterized as risk-sharing contract) or pure altruism. 
They used a dataset of only households that had migrant family member(s), and for their 
pure self-interest model, they included only migrant characteristics.  They reasoned that 
the contract between the migrant and the household should be independent of the contract 
made between other migrant family members and the household. 
 In column 1, only the number of years abroad and the years-abroad-squared 
variables are significant, and the variable indicating that the migrant is employed in the 
service sector is somewhat significant. The number of years abroad has a positive 
coefficient, whereas the squared variable has a negative coefficient. This indicates that 
after a certain number of years abroad, the marginal effect of additional years abroad on 
the likelihood of receiving remittances is negative. This can be explained by a weakening 
of ties with the family after the migrant has lived a certain number of years abroad. The 
positive impact of the linear variable, the number of years abroad, likely reflects the job 
and skills experience of the migrant, as well as his ability to settle and assimilate to some 
degree. All of this should increase his ability to secure a job, or a higher-paying job. The 
variable indicating that the migrant is employed in the service sector is positive and 
almost significant, although the variable for migrants employed in the labor sector has a 
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larger coefficient, though it is not significant. We can conclude that migrants employed in 
either labor and service sectors are more likely to remit than migrants who are not 
employed.   
 We have included columns A to E in Table 1 to control for the likely correlation 
between the migrant’s education level and the number of years abroad, and job type. A 
higher pre-migration education is likely to equip the migrant with the skills needed to 
attain the kind of job/opportunity to remain in the host country for a longer amount of 
time. Thus, in colums A to E we excluded the migrant education variables in each of the 
layers of regression. However, we see that the effects of removing the education variables 
on the coefficients or significance levels are not remarkable. Thus, pre-migration 
education is not significantly correlated to the number of years a migrant stays abroad or 
what kind of jobs they get, in reference to whether or not a migrant remits. Therefore, in 
further discussions of Table 1 we will just focus on columns 1 to 5.  
 Table 2  also shows the results of a probit model used to determine how different 
variables impact the likelihood of a migrant sending remittances, however, unlike table 1, 
this model is from the perspective of the household. Column 1 of this table also includes 
just migrant characteristics, and we see that, both labor and service sector employment 
variables are positive and significant, with the service sector variable being slightly more 
positive. However this could be incorporating the impact of the years abroad variable 
which was positive and significant in table 1, because it is likely that a migrant that has 
been settled in the country for a longer time, or has more experience working in the 
country, would be able to move up into a service sector job – most likely going from a 
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factory worker, to a floor manager, etc.  We cannot include the years abroad variables in 
table 2 because we no longer have individual migrant level data. 
We will continue to analyze tables 1 and 2 together as they are both regressed 
against Ri with a similar set of variables. In column 2, both models include migrant and 
household demographics. The number of years abroad, and years abroad squared in the 
migrant perspective and service and labor employment in the hosehold perspective still 
continue to be significant , and retain the same signs.  But we also see that,  in both 
perspectives, adding household characteristics has explanatory power.  The variables 
d_in_law (the number of daughters-in-law of the household head living in the household 
)and high_edu (the number of household members with beyond secondary education) are 
significant in both household and migrant perspectives. The coefficient on d_in_law is 
positive and negative on edu_high. Both of these are consistent with altruistic 
motivations because the presence of daughter-in-law increases the likelihood that the 
migrant’s wife lives in the household. The strong family ties that generally result from 
marriage most likely increases the dependence of the migrant’s utility on the utility of the 
household, thus increasing his inclination to remit to that household. On the other hand, 
we can look at edu_high as an indication of the houesehold’s earning potential. Thus the 
larger this variable is, the more a household is likely to earn locally, and thus the altruistic 
migrant does not need to remit in response to low household need. However, this 
negative relationship between edu_high and Ri could possibly be due to the fact that 
households who have enough earning capacity at home do not usually send migrants 
abroad, hence causing the negative relationship between remittances and edu_high. 
However, a probit regression of household education levels and other wealth and income 
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variables against the likelihood of having at least one international migrant [see Appendix 
E] shows that none of these variables are at all significant to the presence of migrants 
(though the sign on the edu_high coefficient is negative while the the signs on edu_non 
and and edu_literate - indicating the number of household members who have no 
education or are just literate - are positive).  
Also, in the migrant perspective, the number of migrants within a household has a 
statistically significant positive impact on whether the migrant will remit. Unlike the 
previous findings, this is contrary to the expectations of altruism, which assumes that a 
migrant is concerned with the well-being of the family and thus a larger number of 
migrants should lower the need to remit (Agarwal and Horowitz, 2002). We can also 
view this from a self-interest point of view where the migrant is concerned with his 
inheritance or good reputation back home, and thus migrants from multiple-migrant 
households feel more of a need to remit in order to compete to secure their good name 
with the household. The coexistence of the negative high household education variable 
and the positive number of migrants variable makes any conclusion about the migrant 
motivations uncertain. It is also possible that the positive sign on the number of migrants 
variable is not a reflection of self-interest, but rather the networking services offered by 
having family members abroad. Perhaps due to networking effect, migrants from 
multiple-migrant families find jobs faster, or are able to secure better jobs and thus can 
remit. We need to see how the coefficients on these variables change when we account 
for household wealth.  
Three of the other significant variables also have contradictory implications 
regarding migrant motivations. We find that family size has a negative impact, number of 
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sons has positive impact, while the number of females also has a positive impact. The 
first two are both contrary to altruism and in keeping with a contract model as discussed 
in our theory and variable section. This is because an altruistic remitter would remit more 
to a household with more dependents, while the number of dependents is predicted to not 
have a statistically significant impact on whether a migrant remits in the contract model. 
The number of sons has been treated in other research articles as a variable that indicates 
bargaining power of the parent household due to competition between sons of the 
household for their share of inheritance. Thus a household with more sons is more likely 
to attract remittances, than a household with just one son. However, as inheritance is not 
a concern for the altruistic remitter, the number of sons should not have a significant 
impact. The variable fem_hh, on the other hand, indicates the number of females in the 
household. We assumed that in a region where women are largely homemakers and out 
of the labor force, that the number of females in a household would be an indication of 
the number of non-earning dependents.  The fact that a household with more female 
members are more likely to receive remittances again indicates altruism. However, it 
should be noted that the number of females in the household variable becomes 
insignificant in the following layered regression when we include household wealth. It is 
possible also that family size and fem_hh correlate strongly and therefore skewed the 
results.  
   We see that by adding household characteristics we get mixed findings 
regarding altruism and self-interest contract models. Column 3 includes measures of 
family ties into our model.  The education variable, edu_high continues to be negative 
from both perspectives. The number of sons, however, is now significant in the migrant 
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perspective with a negative coefficient, whereas it is no longer statistically significant 
under the household perspective (though it has also switched signs to a negative 
coefficient.) Thus if we hold family ties variables - such as amount of the household’s 
contribution in migration costs, relationship of migrant to household head and frequency 
of visits - the num_son variable loses much of its explanatory power. Especially in the 
household perspective, the variable son_mig, which is the number of migrants that are 
sons of the household head, is directly correlated to num_son which is the total number of 
migrant and non-migrant sons, thus skewing the coefficients on both. To account for this 
direct collinearity, in Appendix F we ran the probit model without num_son but we found 
that this does not change the sign, significance, or quantity of the son_mig coefficient 
much. In any case, from the migrant perspective, if we account for family ties, we see 
that migrants remit less as the number of sons increases, which is an indicator of altruism. 
However, this effect fails to hold in the next layered model when we account for 
household wealth.  
Looking at the variables for family ties, we cans see that the variable 
high_contribution (denoting that the household can contributed a large portion of 
migration costs for migrants from the family [though we have no way of knowing how 
much contribution was made for each individual migrant]) is positive and statistically 
significant in both the migrant and household perspectives. In our discussion on variables 
and theory we stated that this was a measure of the economic connection between the 
migrant and the household.  A positive coefficient on this variable is consistent with both 
altruism, which is positively associated with strong family ties, and family contract 
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model, in which the migrant remits to repay the household for its investment in his 
migration.  
The variables for migrants that are brothers (bro_mig) and secondary family 
members (secondary_mig), are both significantly negative in the migrant perspective. 
The variable for spouse_mig (migrant that is the spouse of the household head (mainly 
husbands)) is weakly significant and positive. This demonstrates the family ties 
expectations of the altruistic model where closely related migrants, such as spouse are 
more likely to remit, while secondary family members are more likely to not remit. While 
brothers are closely related, the negative relationship between Ri and bro_mig can be 
explained by the fact that the brother most likely has his own separate household to send 
remittances to, thus according to altruism his utility is more dependent on the other 
household. 
However, in the household perspective we find that the secondary_mig variable is 
both siginificant and positive, along with spouse_mig, More interestingly, the 
secondary_mig variable retains its significance and positive sign even as we restrict the 
model more and more. This unlikely finding seems to conflict with altruism which would 
predict that strong family ties would encourage remittances. Instead in the household 
perspective, the positive coefficient on secondary_mig is second in magnitude, only to 
spouse_mig, and is larger than son_mig. One explanation for this is that the 
secondary_mig variable constitutes those members of the household, for whom the 
household is unlikely to have made many human capital investments (i.e. members that 
are not directly related to the household head.) This includes sons-in-law of the 
household head. Thus the strong positive coefficient could be a reflection of the strong 
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ties of marriage, just like the spouse_,mig variable. Unexpectedly small coefficient on 
son_mig indicates that remittances do not serve as repayment for investments in 
education and other human capital building costs, which is one of the main components 
of the family contract model.  
Columns 4 and 5 both embrace household wealth into the model. In column 4 we 
include the log of per-capita income, number of income earners, log of size of land 
owned, and ownership of livestock. In column 5, we also add the variables fantv (for 
ownership of fan and TV) and, all_amenities (ownership of fan, TV and refrigerator ) and 
no_amenities. The reason for the distinction between the two sets of household wealth 
variables is because the regressions show that the ownership of amenities is also likely to 
be caused by remittances, rather than being a factor that drives remittances. Even land 
and livestock ownership display reverse causality, (seem appendix C), however these 
factors also have a lot of theoretical implications, thus we chose to include them as the 
last set of variables in our model. Indeed we see the log likelihood value of our model 
plummet from column 3 to column 4.  
 Adding household wealth variable reduces the significance of both variables for 
the number of sons and number of migrants though they retain their negative and positive 
signs respectively. The log of per-capita income of the household is also significantly 
negatively related to the likelihood of migrant sending remittances. This is a strong 
indicator of altruism. Although, the strength of this indicator is weakened by the fact that 
it is not corroborated by the coefficient on the log of size of land owned by the 
household. Altruism predicts that remittances are either not significantly impacted by 
land ownership, and may even decrease in response to an large level of household wealth, 
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while the self-interest driven family contract strongly predicts that the migrant will be 
more likely to remit to a household with more inheritable assets. The coefficient on 
log_landsize in our model is positive, although, it is not at all significant, which may still 
merit the altruistic implications of the per-capita income coefficient.  
 From the household perspective, both  of the variables for no formal education for 
the migrant, and high level of migrant education yielded statistically significant negative 
coefficients. The coefficient on the variable that includes migrants who are just literate is 
also negative however it is not statistically significant. The coefficient is most negative 
on the no education variable. This seems to indicate that households with migrants that 
have no formal education, or are just able to read and write, or even migrants with high 
level of education are less likely to receive remittances than households with migrants 
with a medium level of education (completion of secondary schooling only). It is difficult 
to derive a clear conclusion from this, however a possible explanation is that highly 
educated migrants are more likely to move for longer time period and thus eventually 
lose connection with the household, whereas non educated or low-educated (just literate) 
migrants may face a lot of difficulty getting a job overseas and are thus unable to remit.  
 The variable daughter in law is once again positive and significant, although 
grandchild is negative and insignificant. This is most likely because the variable 
grandchild includes all the children in a household that are related to the household head 
as grandchildren. Because a household is likely to have more children than daughters-in-
law, the grandchild variable is more likely to be not as significant. Nevertheless, these 
findings conflict with the findings from…. Research, in which the child variable is more 
positive and stat sig. they explain that this is because the wife may also be an earner, 
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therefore the need to provide for the wife is not as present as the need to provide for one’s 
child. However, the data in that study was collected from migrants, thus the variable for 
child only included the migrant’s children and were thus much more relevant. Our data is 
collected from receiving households and is thus missing that individual migrant 
distinction. 
 It is also interesting that neither per capita income nor land size variables are 
statistically significant from the household viewpoint. Another puzzling outcome is that 
once again the coefficient on the number of migrants, who are secondary relatives to the 
household head, is negative and significant from the household viewpoint, whereas from 
the migrant viewpoint, the same variable has a positive and significant coefficient. It is 
worth noting that the secondary_mig coefficient has slightly different interpretations in 
the migrant and household viewpoints. At the migrant level, secondary_mig is a binary 
variable that equals to one if the migrant is a secondary family member of the household 
head. Whereas, at the household level, the secondary_mig variable is not binary. Rather it 
represents the number of migrants in a household that are secondary relatives to the 
household head. Thus a negative relationship between secondary_mig and Ri at the 
household level can be interpreted as the effect of having one more secondarily related 
migrant. Thus while secondary_migrants are likely to remit, it does not necessarily have 
to directly imply that a household with many migrants who are secondary relatives is 
more likely to receive remittances than a household with more of other relatives for 
migrants, such as sons, fathers, spouses, etc. However, the implication of this on theory 
or motivations is still unclear. 
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 Lastly, we see that adding the amenities variables made no significant changes to 
the significance and signs of any of the variables. 
 
 
 
The importance of remittances (Ai) 
Table 3: Migrant Level 
 Regression of importance of remittances received  (all variables are conditional on 
household already receiving positive remittances from abroad) 
Variable: Imp = 1 if Not important, 2=At times Helpful, 3=Helpful, 4= very helpful, 
5=crucial 
 Col 
A 
Colum
n 1 
Col B Colum
n 2 
Col C Colum
n 3 
Col D Column 
4 
Col E Column 
5 
constant 5.509 
(0) 
5.221736 
(0) 
4.08 
(0) 
3.93258
3 
(0.001) 
3.487 
(0.001
) 
3.65149
4 
(0.001) 
6.067 
(0) 
6.535499 
(0) 
6.107 
(0) 
6.300965 
(0) 
Migrant age -
0.0423 
(0.36) 
 
-0.03466 
(0.466) 
-0.023 
(0.592
) 
-
0.01364 
(0.76) 
-0.029 
(0.47) 
-
0.03026 
(0.463) 
-0.04 
(0.609) 
-0.04598 
(0.558) 
-0.063 
(0.41) 
-0.06284 
(0.418) 
Migrant age 
squared 
0.0008 
(0.203
) 
0.000725 
(0.274) 
6E-04 
(0.3) 
0.00050
7 
(0.413) 
5E-04 
(0.326
) 
0.00055
7 
(0.325) 
6E-04 
(0.627) 
0.000559 
(0.634) 
1E-03 
(0.386) 
0.000937 
(0.42) 
No formal 
education 
(migrant) 
 0.137804 
(0.629) 
 -
0.05314 
(0.846) 
 -
0.18611 
(0.464) 
 0.037264 
(0.931) 
 0.124304 
(0.776) 
Just Literate 
(migrant) 
 0.196216 
(0.354) 
 0.03766
7 
 -
0.16819 
 -0.38041 
(0.134) 
 -0.16506 
(0.535) 
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(0.852) (0.362) 
High 
eduction 
(migrant) 
 0.056391 
(0.843) 
 -
0.20029 
(0.471) 
 -0.1418 
(0.578) 
 -0.21371 
(0.563) 
 -0.13474 
(0.711) 
Years 
abroad 
0.0133 
(0.714
) 
0.011978 
(0.743) 
-0.006 
(0.855
) 
-
0.00436 
(0.899) 
-0.008 
(0.794
) 
-
0.00537 
(0.865) 
0.015 
(0.733) 
0.017214 
(0.704) 
7E-04 
(0.987) 
0.002977 
(0.948) 
Years 
abroad 
squared 
-0.001 
(0.512
) 
-0.00095 
(0.551) 
-5E-04 
(0.741
) 
-
0.00061 
(0/684) 
4E-04 
(0.757
) 
0.00027
9 
(0.843) 
1E-04 
(0.942) 
-3.7E-05 
(0.985) 
4E-04 
(0.849) 
0.000223 
(0.908) 
Labor 
occupation 
-1.157 
(0.211
) 
-1.14633 
(0.218) 
-0.231 
(0.791
) 
-
0.25555 
(0.772) 
-0.355 
(0.655
) 
-
0.38495 
(0.632) 
0.154 
(0.594) 
0.207467 
(0.481) 
0.091 
(0.756) 
0.103631 
(0.735) 
Service 
Occupation 
-1.398 
(0.142
) 
-1.3339 
(0.167) 
-0.368 
(0.682
) 
-
0.36238 
(0.691) 
-0.34 
(0.676
) 
-
0.41394 
(0.618) 
(dropped
) 
(dropped
) 
(dropped
) 
(dropped
) 
Family size 
(HH) 
  -0.271 
(0) 
-
0.27375 
(0) 
-0.224 
(0) 
-
0.22484 
(0) 
-0.096 
(0.106) 
-0.09986 
(0.094) 
-0.096 
(0.103) 
-0.09718 
(0.012) 
Number of 
sons 
(HH) 
  0.26 
(0.001
) 
0.26023
1 
(0.001) 
0.107 
(0.149
) 
0.11472
7 
(0.127) 
-0.002 
(0.981) 
0.031084 
(0.759) 
0.074 
(0.456) 
0.083998 
(0.408) 
Number of 
migrants 
  0.066 
(0.37) 
0.06357
6 
(0.39) 
0.257 
(0.001
) 
0.26284
2 
(0.001) 
0.37 
(0.003) 
0.392533 
(0.002) 
0.365 
(0.002) 
0.375527 
(0.002) 
Number of 
females in 
HH 
(fem_hh) 
  0.316 
(0) 
0.31859
3 
(0) 
0.297 
(0) 
0.30318
8 
(0) 
0.161 
(0.014) 
0.167991 
(0.013) 
0.179 
(0.005) 
0.179992 
(0.007) 
Number of 
daughters-
in-law in HH  
  0.116 
(0.427
) 
0.10408
4 
(0.484) 
0.045 
(0.738
) 
0.02841
5 
(0.834) 
0.243 
(0.213) 
0.24599 
(0.22) 
0.131 
(0.504) 
0.141784 
(0.482) 
Number of 
grandchildre
n in HH 
  0.204 
(0.082
) 
0.20434
1 
(0.083) 
0.191 
(0.072
) 
0.19642 
(0.065) 
0.022 
(0.88) 
0.032822 
(0.823) 
0.041 
(0.772) 
0.040057 
(0.782) 
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No formal 
education 
(HH) 
  0.122 
(0.069
) 
0.12776
9 
(0.063) 
0.088 
(0.152
) 
0.09592
4 
(0.127) 
-0.071 
(0.433) 
-0.08325 
(0.363) 
-0.008 
(0.931) 
-0.02002 
(0.829) 
High level of 
education 
(HH) 
  0.265 
(0.149
) 
0.32529
6 
(0.096) 
-0.097 
(0.567
) 
-
0.11421 
(0.529) 
-0.082 
(0.726) 
-0.10021 
(0.692) 
-0.412 
(0.104) 
-0.37857 
(0.166) 
Some HH 
contribution 
to migration 
costs 
    0.145 
(0.411
) 
0.14729
9 
(0.409) 
0.187 
(0.42) 
0.172299 
(0.462) 
0.204 
(0.366) 
0.189113 
(0.412) 
High HH 
contribution 
to migration 
costs 
    1.041 
(0) 
1.04298
2 
(0) 
1.151 
(0) 
1.164972 
(0) 
1.193 
(0) 
1.199544 
(0) 
Visit once 
every 2 
years or 
more 
(migrant) 
    0.07 
(0.5) 
0.06762
5 
(0.517) 
-0.3 
(0.064) 
-0.31836 
(0.052) 
-0.352 
(0.027) 
-0.35877 
(0.027) 
Visit once 
every 5 
years or less 
(migrant) 
    -0.552 
(0.003
) 
-
0.56042 
(0.004) 
-0.445 
(0.113) 
-0.47907 
(0.095) 
-0.445 
(0.106) 
-0.45205 
(0.11) 
Son of HH 
head 
(migrant) 
    0.188 
(0.286
) 
0.17500
5 
(0.327) 
0.188 
(0.387) 
0.190104 
(0.391) 
0.179 
(0.398) 
0.182986 
(0.4) 
Brother of 
HH head 
(migrant) 
    0.432 
(0.067
) 
0.40701
8 
(0.088) 
0.758 
(0.029) 
0.75356 
(0.035) 
0.693 
(0.043) 
0.702323 
(0.05) 
Spouse of 
HH head 
(migrant) 
    1.232 
(0) 
1.26989
6 
(0) 
0.457 
(0.443) 
0.666489 
(0.273) 
0.59 
(0.315) 
0.673179 
(0.262) 
Secondary 
relative of 
HH head 
(migrant) 
    -0.261 
(0.267
) 
-
0.27253 
(0.255) 
-0.329 
(0.306) 
-0.33392 
(0.313) 
-0.118 
(0.718) 
-0.13208 
(0.699) 
Log per 
capita 
income 
(HH) 
      -0.377 
(0) 
-0.37697 
(0) 
-0.342 
(0.001) 
-0.34245 
(0.001) 
Number of 
income 
earners 
(HH) 
      -0.268 
(0.181) 
-0.30426 
(0.134) 
-0.255 
(0.193) 
-0.26928 
(0.178) 
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Log of size 
of land 
(HH) 
      -0.092 
(0.328) 
-0.1142 
(0.231) 
-0.132 
(0.159) 
-0.14241 
(0.136) 
Own 
livestock 
(HH) 
      0.256 
(0.362) 
0.2533 
(0.371) 
0.274 
(0.335) 
0.264714 
(0.362) 
No 
Amenities 
(HH) 
        -0.064 
(0.812) 
-0.0259 
(0.926) 
Own fan and 
TV (HH) 
        -0.018 
(0.94) 
-0.00643 
(0.98) 
Own all 3 
amenities 
(fan, tv, 
fridge) 
(HH( 
        1.01 
(0.006) 
0.945962 
(0.014) 
  N=327  N=327  N=327  N=149  N=149 
 
Table 4:Household Level 
Regression of importance of remittances received (all variables are conditional on 
household already receiving positive remittances from abroad) 
Dependent Variable: Imp = 1 if Not important, 2=At times Helpful, 3=Helpful, 4= very 
helpful, 5=crucial 
 
 Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 
constant 3.852075 
(0) 
3.980335 
(0) 
2.802307 
(0) 
5.236776 
(0) 
4.96887 
(0) 
Migrant age      
Migrant age 
squared 
     
No formal 
education 
(migrant) 
0.130838 
(0.63) 
-9.57E-06 
(1) 
-0.31521 
(0.168) 
-0.14252 
(0.762) 
-0.05348 
(0.911) 
Just Literate 
(migrant) 
0.196021 
(0.283) 
0.050889 
(0.786) 
-0.04561 
(0.764) 
-0.14058 
(0.572) 
-0.00796 
(0.977) 
High eduction 
(migrant) 
0.064984 
(0.803) 
-0.06665 
(0.802) 
-0.09386 
(0.649) 
-0.18349 
(0.608) 
-0.14997 
(0.674) 
Years abroad      
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Years abroad 
squared 
     
Labor occupation -0.09723 
(0.627) 
-0.0747 
(0.907) 
0.007136 
(0.989) 
0.114295 
(0.723) 
0.046263 
(0.889) 
Service 
Occupation 
-0.27306 
(0.244) 
-0.23358 
(0.726) 
-0.14158 
(0.79) 
-0.05081 
(0.893) 
-0.05285 
(0.89) 
Family size 
(HH) 
 -0.28437 
(0) 
-0.09232 
(0.065) 
-0.04108 
(0.628) 
-0.04683 
(0.583) 
Number of sons 
(HH) 
 0.247792 
(0.011) 
-0.082 
(0.384) 
-0.13987 
(0.37) 
-0.06146 
(0.702) 
Number of 
migrants 
 0.123033 
(0.853) 
0.000296 
(1) 
(dropped) (dropped) 
Number of 
females in HH 
(fem_hh) 
 0.291185 
(0) 
0.175369 
(00.001) 
0.147802 
(0.113) 
0.159322 
(0.088) 
Number of 
daughters-in-law 
in HH 
 0.109846 
(0.568) 
-0.07287 
(0.635) 
0.097903 
(0.724) 
0.013676 
(0.961) 
Number of 
grandchildren 
in HH 
 0.2558 
(0.063) 
0.179169 
(0.101) 
-0.03248 
(0.866) 
-0.00442 
(0.982) 
No formal 
education (HH) 
 0.020505 
(0.811) 
0.007421 
(0.915) 
-0.08252 
(0.496) 
-0.03261 
(0.792) 
High level of 
education (HH) 
 0.171701 
(0.544) 
-0.25671 
(0.249) 
-0.13674 
(0.732) 
-0.38316 
(0.377) 
Some HH 
contribution to 
migration costs 
  -0.045 
(0.821) 
-0.08151 
(0.797) 
-0.02719 
(0.932) 
High HH 
contribution to 
migration costs 
  0.43044 
(0.016) 
0.629326 
(0.09) 
0.618405 
(0.094) 
Visit once every 
2 years or more 
(migrant) 
  -0.12739 
(0.299) 
-0.21647 
(0.315) 
-0.29785 
(0.176) 
Visit once every 
5 years or less 
(migrant) 
  -0.67031 
(0.006) 
-0.34683 
(0.407) 
-0.28718 
(0.496) 
Son of HH head 
(migrant) 
  1.022071 
(0) 
0.852357 
(0.005) 
0.744912 
(0.017) 
Brother of HH 
head 
(migrant) 
  0.607438 
(0) 
0.580992 
(0.05) 
0.5449 
(0.066) 
Spouse of HH 
head 
  2.186528 1.462337 1.553678 
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(migrant) (0) (0.009) (0.006) 
Secondary 
relative of HH 
head 
(migrant) 
  0.005857 
(0.974) 
0.392261 
(0.234) 
0.286945 
(0.391) 
Log per capita 
income 
(HH) 
   -0.2915 
(0.03) 
-0.27882 
(0.041) 
Number of 
income earners 
(HH) 
   -0.18699 
(0.457) 
-0.17676 
(0.481) 
Log of size of 
land 
(HH) 
   -0.15684 
(0.221) 
-0.15918 
(0.213) 
Own livestock 
(HH) 
   0.529162 
(0.179) 
0.541777 
(0.171) 
No Amenities 
(HH) 
    0.008049 
(0.982) 
Own fan and TV 
(HH) 
    0.004253 
(0.989) 
Own all 3 
amenities 
(fan, tv, fridge) 
(HH( 
    0.880457 
(0.087) 
 N=220 N=220 N=220 N=96 N=96 
 
 We now move onto our second set of models, using the dependent variable Ai 
which ranges from one to five, depending on the importance of the remittances to the 
receiving household. In these sets of models, we only use those households and migrants 
that receive/send positive remittances. The results from these models are much more 
consistent, in that the significance and signs on the coefficients do not fluctuate as much 
in response to the addition of other variables (i.e. successive layers), and the behavior of 
coefficients is quite similar between the migrant and household levels. However, we must 
take into consideration right at the outset, one of the biggest shortcomings of this model. 
The variable Ai could be a reflection of the receiving household’s lack of wealth or 
income, i.e. need, or a reflection of (the way we intend for it to be used) the amount of 
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remittances the migrant is sending. We assume, that for remittances to be important to a 
household, it cannot be an insignificant amount. From column 4 on, we do control for 
household income, thus at least beyond that point we can more forcefully assume that the 
results are estimating the relative amount of remittances to a household. We will look at 
the variable coefficients to discern what household and migrant characteristics lead to 
remittances in amounts significant enough to make a real impact on the household.  
 Due to the relatively greater consistency of the variables using this dependent 
variable, and restricting our data to remittance receiving and sending households and 
migrants, we can make our analysis more broadly than by going layer by layer.  
 Just as with Table 1, we controlled for the possible correlation between the pre-
migration education level of migrants and the number of years abroad and the type of 
jobs they acquire. Again, we found no significant change in either coefficients or 
significance. Thus the level of education does not significantly correlate to the duration of 
stay or the type of job with respect to the importance of remittance to the household. 
 In both the migrant and household perspectives, family size has a negative impact 
on the importance of remittances, and it remains significant in all restricted and 
unrestricted equations at the migrant level. However at the household level the 
significance drops once household income and wealth are accounted for. The negative 
relationship between the importance of remittances and family size can be interpreted in a 
number of ways. It can be seen as a contradiction to altruism because migrants are  not 
remitting more to households with more dependents. Or it could be that households with 
more dependents have a greater level of need, and the amount remitted is not enough to 
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be important, or even that a household with more members, have more earners and thus 
do not regard the remittances as being very important. To choose between these 
interpretations we can look at the coefficients on per capita income (logpercap_income) 
(which takes into account both the income of the household and the number of people in 
the household), number of income earners (HH_Inc) and number of female members in 
household (fem_hh).  The coefficients on the log of per capita income and the number of 
income earners variables are both negative in both the migrant and household 
perspectives, although only the per capita income coefficient is statistically significant. 
This indicates that the higher a household’s income is and the more income earners it has, 
the less important the remittances are. This is in keeping with the idea of altruism, such 
that the lower a household’s per capita income is, and the less income earners it has, the 
more important (or larger) remittances it will receive.  This finding can also be explained 
by a previously cited reasoning that higher income earning households are less likely to 
deem a certain level of remittances as important. Yet, this still does not deduct from the 
finding that lower income earning households are both more likely to receive remittances, 
and also in more (relatively) significant amounts. The coefficient on fem_hh is also 
positive and significant in all the layered regressions, and in both the migrant and 
household levels. Thus a household with more dependents is more likely to receive more 
important remittances, also in keeping with altruism. All of these findings lead us to 
believe that the negative coefficient on family size is not a contradiction to altruism. 
 The variable for the number of sons in a household is not significant in either the 
household or migrant levels. The coefficient on grandchild is positive and significant in 
both the migrant and household level perspectives, until we account for household 
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income, which as previously mentioned, has negative and significant coefficients. Thus 
we can guess that households with more grandchildren are likely to have less per capita 
income (due to more children, who are unlikely to be earners) and thus had a significantly 
positive impact on the importance of remittances when household per capita income was 
not included in the model. The positive coefficient on grandchild is also an indicator of 
altruism. 
 The variable indicating the family’s high contribution in the costs of migration 
(high_contribute) is positive and significant in all of the nested regressions in both the 
migrant and household perspectives. This variable demonstrates the strength of the 
household’s economic ties or economic support, and thus a positive coefficient is 
consistent with altruism. However, as we previously mentioned, this finding can also 
offer support to a investment repayment function of contract-driven remittances.  The 
coefficient on bro_mig is also positive and significant in all of the nested regressions in 
both migrant and household levels. Thus it seems that while the regressions on Ri, the 
likelihood of receiving remittances, seemed to show that the brother migrant is unlikely 
to remit, yet when we restrict our sample to brother migrants who do remit, it seems that 
they remit in significant amounts. None of the other kinship indicators for migrants, 
son_mig, spouse_mig, secondary_mig, were significant though son_mig and spouse_mig 
is always positive, whereas secondary_mig is always negative at the migrant level, all of 
which is consistent with altruism and its predictions on remittances and the strength of 
family ties. At the household level, on the other hand, secondary_mig is always positive, 
however it is also always insignificant.  
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 Ownership of all three types of amenities(all_amenities) is also always positive 
and significant in both migrant and household levels. Yet this does not correspond to the 
negative sign on the per capita income and number of income earners coefficients. Thus 
it may be possible to attribute the positive sign on all_amenities to reverse causality 
where the remittances are in fact leading to the ownership of all three amenities. There is 
basis for this explanation in regressions of the impact of remittances, and presence of 
migrants ownership of amenities (see Appendix C). 
2.6 Conclusion 
 We have attempted to determine what motivates the remittances received by 
households in rural Bangladesh. We used two different dependent variables – the binary 
variable of the likelihood of receiving remittances (Ri), and the Importance of 
remittances received to the household (Ai) which has values ranging from one to five. 
We also used two sets of data, one of which uses the migrant level perspective, and one 
which looks at the household level perspective. Altogether we used four different models 
and nested regressions.  
While the findings have been detailed in the analysis section, we would like to point out a 
few overall trends in our data.  
 Overall, migration characteristics proved quite insignificant in determining 
positive remittances, or the amount or importance of remittances. Most surprisingly, 
migrant education level coefficients were highly insignificant in all of our model 
estimations. This is sharply in contrast to the investment hypothesis put forth by Lucas 
and Stark(1985) for the family contract model. Only the square of the number of years 
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abroad was significant, and negative (with a very small coefficient), in determining 
whether migrant will send remittances at all. This implies a gradual decrease in the 
likelihood of sending remittances.  
 When we included household variables into our models we found that the 
coefficients on the variables for the log of per capita income, and high education levels 
for household members were consistently negative. This seems to suggest that 
households with higher income and levels of education receive fewer remittances. 
However, regressions of household wealth characteristics against the presence and 
number of migrants in a household, displayed significantly negative relationships, so that 
households with higher incomes are less likely to send migrants abroad. Yet even if we 
look at these same income and education variables in the Ai models, where we restricted 
our sample for only those households that have migrant relatives, we see that they are still 
negative. This may be a reflection of the fact that a higher educated and higher income 
earning household is less likely to depend heavily on remittances and thus think them 
very important (which is what the Ai variable measures).  
Yet in both the Ri  and Ai models, we cannot deny that for one reason or another, 
lower income households are more likely to receive remittances and also receive them in 
significant amounts. This discredits the possibility of migrants remitting in hopes of 
inheriting household wealth. We also see that the relationship between the reception of 
remittances and the number of females (i.e. dependents) in the household is positive, and 
that size of land owned by the household is insignificant to the estimation, both of which 
also provide support for the lack of self-interest driven motivations in our sample.  
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 An evaluation of measures of family ties also shows a positive relationship 
between strong family ties (indicated by high contribution of the household in migration 
expenses, relationships of son and spouse between migrant and household head, etc.) and 
the likelihood and importance of remittances. Though, some of the relationship variables, 
such as those for migrants that are brothers of the household head, or secondary relatives, 
often demonstrated conflicting behavior between different models, an overall survey of 
the likelihood of sons and spouses remitting, or households with daughters-in-laws or 
grandchildren receiving remittances, indicate that stronger family ties lead to more 
likelihood of remitting. This outcome is predicted by both altruism and the family 
contract model. We also noticed that the coefficient on the variable for son of migrant, 
while always positive, is also frequently insignificant and small. In fact, oftentimes 
brother and secondary relatives showed more of a positive and significant relationship 
with the importance of remittances. This also goes against Lucas and Stark’s investment 
component of the family contract hypothesis -  that “own young” or household young 
(i.e. members who have been brought up by the household, and whose education is most 
likely to have been paid for  by the household) will remit more than other migrant family 
members at high levels of education, as a way to repay the household for their 
investment.  
While our findings do not clearly point to a specific motivation for remitting, they 
do indicate that households in Mirzapur do not make migration decisions within a family 
contract model that relies on remittances as repayment for household investments in the 
migrant’s human capital, nor do migrants remit under the self-interest driven motivation 
of inheriting wealth. Both of these discredited hypotheses are components of the self-
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interest driven family contract model. Since less wealthier households are more likely to 
send migrants and receive remittances in our sample, it is more likely that migration is a 
means of increasing income for the purpose of securing household welfare by struggling 
households, and remittances are driven by strong family ties. Both of these statements on 
the other hand, indicate altruism. However, we do not have enough evidence in our data 
to merit an altruism model either. We are not able to clearly show, for example, that 
remittances decrease with the amount of land owned, or the number of sons, as both 
variables were either insignificant, or unstable and contradictory between regressions. 
A longitudinal study which maps the household’s remittance reception in 
response to household income fluctuations, additional variables that indicate the 
migrant’s intentions of settling or returning from the destination region, as well as 
information on the actual amounts of remittances received by the household, would better 
inform a conclusion on the motivations that drive remittances. For this study, we 
conclude that while we cannot provide sufficient evidence for a predominantly altruistic 
model in our sample, we have been able to provide limited evidence against the 
possibility that the remittances in Mirzapur serve as returns on household investment or 
are driven by inheritance-driven motivations. 
In part 2, we have studied the reception of remittances by households in rural 
Bangladesh, and the determinants which impact whether a household will receive 
remittances, and how much remittances a household receives. Our dataset was composed 
of households on the receiving side of remittances.  In the next part of this paper, we will 
turn our attention to studying the remittance-sending population. We have looked at 
migrant remitters in part 2 by using information on migrant relatives in our rural 
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household surveys, however, an overwhelming majority of these migrants are in the 
middle east, working as labor. Yet, aggregate migration and remittance data for 
Bangladesh, also indicates that a significant flow of migrants move to developed western 
countries, especially the United States (Siddiqui, 2004a,b) and remit in significant 
amounts back to Bangladesh. This group of migrants usually resides in the host country 
for a much longer term, and often become permanent residents, thus forming more of a 
stable and relatively well-off Bangladeshi diaspora when compared to the temporary 
labor migrant populations in places like the middle east and southeast asia.  
Research on established diaspora populations from other countries like India, 
China and the Philippines, has shown that the besides providing private remittances, the 
diaspora can also provide other ket funding support and services that a temporary low-
skilled migrant population cannot. Diasporas of other countries have been able to offer 
substantial amount of collective support (collective remittances) to support public 
development projects in their home countries, and well as offer various professional and 
political support. This is broadly termed as diaspora philanthropy, a relatively new area in 
research in the context of migration and remittances.  
 Thus in Part 3, we turn our attention to a small empirical study conducted 
to explore the potential of the Bangladeshi diaspora in the United States to contribute to 
progress and development in Bangladesh through philanthropy. Understandably, this is a 
departure from the topic of private household remittances that we have been looking at 
thus far, however, we include this portion primarily to introduce the reader to a newer 
area in remittance research and to encourage future research in this topic. 
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Section 3: Diaspora Philanthropy 
3.1 Introduction 
Thus far, this paper has focused on micro-level transactions made between labor 
migrants and the household. Labor remittances are of huge consequence to many 
receiving nations, for whom the large inflow remittances form a significant part of the 
nation’s GDP, as well as the major source of important foreign exchange earnings. Thus 
it is important to understand the nature of remittances flowing into a country in order to 
enact effective policies to best utilize their positive impacts. This paper has focused 
mainly on understanding the motivation behind remittances flowing into rural 
Bangladesh, in order to contribute to the necessary and important discourse on how to 
design effective policies and money transaction operations, to fully harness the positive 
impact of remittances on receiving nations.  
  However, Bangladesh as well as many other remittance-receiving nations, such as 
China, India, Mexico and the Philippines, has a considerable diaspora. Yet, what is 
imparted by the term diaspora? The definition of diaspora is varied across social, 
political, economic and historical literature on migration and expatriate communities. 
Sociologist, Pnina Werbner (2005), emphasizes that diasporas are not just ethnic 
communities, in that, unlike ethnic communities, diasporas are more defined by civic 
engagement. Ethnic communities according to Werbner (2005) are more tied to a 
physical space, whereas members of the diaspora are more connected intellectually 
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through feelings of co-responsibility and tendency towards active engagement in the 
welfare of the community or country of origin.  
 While this offers an intriguing understanding of diaspora, as a collection of 
displaced people who are devoted to actively bettering their origin communities, in this 
study, we adopt a broader understanding of diaspora. We use a definition that is similar to 
the one used by Siddiqui (2004b) in her paper focused on the Bangladeshi diaspora in the 
United Kingdom and United States. We hold that a diaspora is a community of migrants 
that are settled (usually permanently) in host countries, and maintain a sense of identity, 
as well as different degrees of ties with the country of origin and with other members of 
the same diaspora (Siddiqui, 2004b).  
It is commonly found that, compared to temporary labor migrants, expatriates who settle 
in destination regions are typically characterized by relatively higher skills, and higher-
paying jobs (Siddiqui, 2004a). 
In this last section, we will briefly bring attention to the field of diaspora 
philanthropy, a phenomenon that has considerable potential for impacting progress in 
developing nations. Diaspora philanthropy is popularly views as actions performed by 
members of the diaspora that promotes social, political, scientific, cultural and economic 
advancement in the country of origin, however, the term requires a bit more specification.   
Like diaspora, the term diaspora philanthropy has many variations; the differences 
between each are informative of their applications in different papers and discussions. In 
setting the definition for diaspora philanthropy, we will once more borrow from the 
definition of another work of diaspora literature, “Diaspora Philanthropy: Influences, 
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Initiatives” by Paula Doherty Johnson (2007). She states three fundamental elements 
comprise diaspora philanthropy: 
“(1)charitable giving from individuals who reside outside their homeland, who (2) maintain a 
sense of identity with their home country, (3) give to causes or organizations in that country, and 
(4) give for public benefit.” 
 
While the concept of giving back to one’s home country or community is by no 
means a new one and has been a component of the earliest waves of migration, diaspora 
philanthropy as a term is more recent. This is partially because migration has evolved 
immensely in the last few decades, as people’s mobility increased incrementally, and 
people moved between nations at higher annual rates. With the increased movement of 
people, there are larger transnational communities created through the ties that still exist 
between migrants and their families in the origin country. A large expression of 
transnational ties is economic transfers made by the migrant back to the household. While 
these transfers also predate to much earlier migration, with the increased volume of 
migration, the bulk of transnational transfers is much more substantial. Furthermore, a 
considerable portion of these growing international transfers are used to benefit public 
rather than private causes, thus bringing more and more attention to the term diaspora 
philanthropy. 
However, diaspora philanthropy is still a relatively newer area in migration 
literature. As such, there are many countries with large diasporas that have not yet 
invested in research to fully understand the specific dynamics and potential usefulness of 
its own expatriate community. In the existent literature much has been written about the 
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benefits a country would receive by harnessing the services and financial support the 
relatively well-off and well-established diaspora can offer. 
 Members of the diaspora have been instrumental in the transfer of capital, 
knowledge, and ideas to their regions or communities of origin. Migrants themselves are 
sources of various types of capital such as economic, social and human capital. Economic 
capital involves spending on origin country exports, and tourism, as well as financial 
contributions made to promote development projects. Their social capital lies in their 
ability to create social networks between members in the host country and the origin 
country, while human capital involves their often specialized knowledge and skills in 
their fields or profession, their knowledge on the financial, and political operations of 
their country of residence which could be valuable to burgeoning home country industries 
trying to establish themselves in the host region. Due to this, diaspora philanthropy is not 
exclusively made up of transfers of economic resources, such as collective remittances by 
members of the diaspora to support certain causes back home. An important aspect of 
diaspora philanthropy, that is gaining more and more attention, is the exchange of skills 
and ideas.  For example, members of the large Chinese diaspora have been instrumental 
in integrating Chinese businesses and trade initiatives into the international community 
by helping Chinese companies apply rules of international organizations (Dunn, 2004). 
Similarly, the Indian diaspora in the UK and USA has successfully lobbied the 
governments of those nations to support issues that promote India’s interests (Siddiqui, 
2004b). Peggy Levitt, the…., reports that members of the Pakistani diaspora in Boston 
give out $5000 grants to a person who comes with the best business plan for a business 
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intiative either in Pakistan or the US, or involving both. They also offer advice to the 
Pakistani government on labor and education policies (see Dunn, 2004). 
 Thus it can be seen that besides mobilizing economic resources for development 
funds, members of the diaspora can also organize and contribute  to the origin country by 
offering advocacy services, transferring skills and specialized knowledge to promote 
development, lobby national and  international governments to address important civic 
and development issues, engage in cultural exchange, promoting awareness about country 
of origin in host community, creating demand for origin (UN-NGLS, 2007).  
 Bangladesh, despite having a large expatriate community, and being the recipient 
of a large amount of remittance inflow, does not enjoy most of the non-remittance 
benefits of diaspora communities. This has been attributed to the lack of research and 
available data on how to effectively engage the diaspora and allow for collaboration and 
meaningful contribution (Ionescu, 2006). Yet Bangladesh stands to gain a lot from 
greater diaspora involvement in the nation’s welfare, through services such as 
consultation with developing credible investment mechanisms in order to increase 
overseas capital flow into Bangladesh, skills transfers from numerous Bangladeshi non-
resident highly-skilled professionals, advocating effective and positive economic reform 
in Bangladesh, as well as lobbying international governments to offer more favorable 
economic (trade) policies towards Bangladesh. For example, Bangladeshi ready-made 
garments exports into the United States faces a hefty 15.3% tariff rate, while the same 
type of exports enter almost tariff free from countries in Africa. Moreover, tariffs for 
other developed countries like UK, Canada and France are below one percent.  Much of 
the difference in tariff rates is due to the presence (or absence) of powerful lobbying 
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groups that pressure host country governments, such as that of the US, for trade policies 
that are favorable to the home economy.  
 Like Bangladesh, many other financially constrained nations hesitate to spend 
resources to cultivate homeland investment by the diaspora because they are unsure about 
the potential and willingness of their respective diasporas to invest. However other 
countries, like India, Afghanistan and Dominican Republic, recognize the potential of 
their diasporas to boost social and economic advancement, and thus invest substantial 
resources to develop government agencies and enact policies to foster diaspora interest in 
investing in the homeland (Johnson, 2007). Jonhson states that:  
“Diaspora philanthropy may represent an underappreciated but emerging opportunity to 
convert private wealth to philanthropic capital and to use it effectively to address some of 
the world’s most pressing challenges.” 
In this last part of our study, we would like to detail the results of a small online 
survey we conducted on members of the Bangladeshi diaspora in the United States, in 
order to determine the potential of the Bangladeshi diaspora to engage in philanthropy 
related to Bangladesh. 
 Nielsen and Riddle (2007) posit that an individual’s likelihood of becoming 
involved in philanthropic activities in his home country is dependent on his social 
embeddedness, among some other factors. Social embeddedness, as described in their 
paper, is a sociological measure of the strength of the social ties an individual has with 
his community back home. The survey conducted in this study includes questions on the 
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respondent’s frequency of visits to Bangladesh, and tendency to send gifts as a measure 
of their social embeddedness. 
We also included questions on different types of philanthropy efforts, ranging 
from collective remittances, to skills transfer and advocacy, to determine what types of 
efforts the US-Bangladeshi diaspora is most interested in. 
The objective of this survey was to get a brief profile of the Bangladeshi diaspora 
and their ties to Bangladesh, as well as to probe what issues in development the 
Bangladeshi expatriates are most interested in and willing to support through funds, what 
kinds of philanthropy efforts they are already involved in, and what type of obstacles they 
face in trying to offer economic support to Bangladesh. 
 
 
 
3.2 Survey Data 
A profile of the Bangladeshi Diaspora in the United States: Description and Analysis 
The survey was conducted online between the months of January to April of 
2010. It was distributed to several Bangladeshis, through the database of the Embassy of 
Bangladesh in DC, as well as through request to several Bangladeshi cultural and 
philanthropy organizations. We have a total of 141 respondents. In the next two sections 
we will summarize the findings of the survey and briefly discuss its implications. 
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Descriptive Statistics 
MIGRANT DEMOGRAPHICS    
Where are you from? (Top 2) 1. Dhaka (46.4%) 
2. Chittagong(12.5%) 
  
Age  Mean: 48.55 Max: 
73 
Min: 
28 
Sex Male: 91.1% 
Female: 8.9% 
  
Religion: Islam: 80.36% 
Hinduism: 3.57 
Other: 14.29 
  
Education : 
- Some College/Associate Degree 
- Bachelors (B.A., B.S.)/College 
Undergraduate completed 
- Masters/Post-Graduate (e.g. M.A.) 
- Post-Doctorate/Higher Degree 
(PhD, MD, JD, EdD, etc.) 
 
1.75% 
14.0% 
 
59.7% 
24.6% 
  
Reason for moving to USA:    
- To pursue further education  
- To stay with family and friends  
- To stay with spouse who lives in 
USA  
- To seek work opportunity  
- To accept a job already offered to 
you  
- Migration lottery  
- Other  
 
 
51.5% 
6.1% 
4.6% 
22.7% 
3.0% 
1.5% 
10.6% 
  
Number of Years in USA: Mean: 22.18 yrs Max: 
42yrs 
Min: 
3yrs 
State of Residence in USA (Top 3) 1. California (28.1%) 
2. Virginia (21.1%) 
3. Maryland (15.8%) 
  
Occupation 
Type of Employer (top 5): 
- Private Sector 
- Public Sector 
- Self-employed 
- National Government 
- State Government 
  
 
43.9% 
10.5% 
10.5% 
8.8% 
5.3% 
 
  
Occupation Type (top 5): 
- Computer and Mathematical 
Science 
- Other 
- Architecture and Engineering 
- Business and Financial Operations 
 
17.5% 
17.5% 
15.8% 
14.0% 
10.5% 
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- Science (Life, Physical, Social, 
etc.) 
 
 
    
HOUSEHOLD INFORMATION    
Household size in USA Mean: 2.96 Max: 8 Min:0 
How many family members live in the 
USA? 
None 
Less than 5 members 
5 – 10  members 
10 – 20 members 
More than 20 members 
 
 
3.5% 
22.81% 
21.05% 
28.1% 
24.6% 
  
How many of these family members moved 
to USA after you settled here? 
Mean:6.38 Max: 
35 
Min:0 
How many of your family members still 
live in Bangladesh? 
- None 
- Less than 5 
- 5 – 10 members 
- 10 – 20 members 
- More than 20 members 
 
 
5.3% 
19.3% 
17.5% 
7.0% 
50.9% 
 
 
  
FAMILY TIES    
- Frequency of visits to Bangladesh: 
Once a year or more 
- 1/year to 1/5 years 
- 1/6years to 1/10 
- Less than 1/10 years 
 
28.1% 
59.6% 
7.0% 
5.3% 
  
Frequency of  visits from Bangladesh: 
- Once a year or more 
- 1/year to 1/5 years 
- 1/6years to 1/10 
- Less than 1/10 years 
 
26.3% 
49.1% 
7.0% 
15.8% 
  
Do you send remittances? Yes (93%) 
No (7%) 
  
Frequency of sending remittances: 
- More than once a year 
- Once a year 
- Once every 2 years 
- Once every 5 years 
 
58.5% 
24.5% 
7% 
7% 
  
 
3.2.1 Diaspora Demographics 
From the data shown above, it can be seen that most of our sample is middle-aged 
muslim males. It should also be noted that the sample of respondents are highly-educated 
106 
 
professionals. Almost all of the respondents have a Bachelors degree or higher (except 
for only 1.5%) and the bulk of the respondents have a masters degree or higher. They also 
mostly work in private sector jobs in computer and mathematical science, architecture 
and engineering and business and financial operations.  
It is also interesting that most respondents cite that they moved to the United 
States to pursue further education (51.5%) while a significant number of respondents 
(22.7%) cite economic reasons. This outcome is in fact in keeping with the migrant 
statistics that describes the second wave of Bangladeshi migration to the US that took 
place during the 1960s and was composed of mainly of professionals and students 
looking to pursue further education (Siddiqui, 2004b). This migrant demographic is 
clearly different from the more recent Bangladeshi inflows into USA, which has a greater 
proportion of low-skilled workers. Similarly, in keeping with the high level of education 
and professional occupations, our sample also reflects a largely settled Bangladeshi 
immigrant population, most of whom have been here for more than 20 years.  
Given, the above sample characteristics, it should be noted that this sample is not 
a reflection of the entire Bangladeshi migrant population in the United States. Especially 
with the more recent increase in the influx of low-skilled immigrants, in non-specialized 
employment sectors, a more inclusive sample would have more representation in lower 
education and less skill-intensive professions.  This bias was mostly likely caused by our 
use of embassy contacts, and media and philanthropy organizations as both of these are 
likely to select for professional, well-established diaspora members.  However, in the 
context of this study, this bias might be helpful in focusing attention on a group of people 
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who are well equipped in terms of skills, networks, as well as resources to offer the 
diaspora services we discussed earlier.  
3.2.2 Household Information: 
 Respondents have an average of 2.96 person households (excluding respondent) 
with a maximum of 8 person household. This average household size is slightly larger 
than the average household size in USA, 2.59. Also, most respondents have more than 
five family members living in USA, with almost a quarter of respondents with more than 
20 members. Interestingly, respondents reported an average of 6.38 family members 
moved to the United States after the migrant, thus we can assume that our sample 
represents a group of relatively early migrants. This question was also  
and willing to invest their human, economic and/or social resources for the betterment of 
Bangladesh.    
In response to how aware participants are about current issues in the social, cultural, 
economic, health, and political issues n Bangladesh,  we found that almost everyone cited 
at least some level of awareness on each of the aspects. Only two people claimed to not 
be at all aware of health issues. In fact, health was commonly cited as the aspect of 
Bangladesh respondents were not very or quite aware of. Social and cultural aspects were 
most commonly cited as what respondents were very well aware of. However, economic 
awareness is also quite impressive, as 54% claimed to be very well aware of economic 
issues. Moreover, if we also include being at least quite well aware, then awareness about 
the economy (95%) actually surpasses cultural awareness. included to see whether 
members of the diaspora play any role in encouraging further emigration from his/her 
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household in the country of origin. While more than half of the respondents claimed to 
having five relatives move to USA after them, almost 20% claimed to have zero family 
members following them. Also, while the response to this question can serve as an 
indicator, there is no way to know whether it is an accurate one, for time difference in 
migration does not imply causation. 
 We looked at frequency of visits by the migrant to Bangladesh, and visits from 
relatives from Bangladesh as a measure of family ties and found that frequency of visits 
both to and from Bangladesh is quite high. Very few respondents visit less than once 
every ten years, while most visit more than once every five years, and more than a quarter 
of respondents visit once a year or more. Surprisingly, a similar trend exists in visits from 
Bangladesh.  This is very different from our findings from households in rural 
Bangladesh, where family members almost never visit migrant relatives abroad. That 
most of our respondents get visits from Bangladesh once every five years or more 
indicates that the immigrants in our sample come from households that are much more 
lucrative and have greater capacity for mobility than the typical low income labor 
migrant-sending households in Bangladesh.  
3.2.3 Ties with Bangladesh 
  For this part of the survey, we attempted to determine social 
embeddedness of members of the diaspora, by asking questions that explore their level of 
awareness about different aspects of Bangladesh, their desire to eventually settle in 
Bangladesh, their emotional connection with Bangladesh, as well as their tangible 
economic connections with their families in Bangladesh. Through these questions, we 
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hope to get a picture of how much (or little) members of the US-Bangladeshi diaspora are 
still emotionally and economically invested tied to Bangladesh. Altogether, these 
variables that measure social embeddedness, will serve as one type of indicator of 
whether the US-diaspora would be interested 
Also, more than half than half of the sample claimed that Bangladesh played a 
very big part in their life, while 40.3% claimed it was fairly important, and only s 3.5% of 
respondent claimed it was not very important. Though there was a “not at all important” 
option, none of the respondents chose it. While the nature of the question is quite vague 
and arbitrary we hold that it still has some value as an indicator of the emotional value 
Bangladesh has in the lives of the respondents.  In a separate question asking whether 
they plan to eventually settle in Bangladesh, we see that the “yes” and “no” responses are 
quite close, 21.1% and 22.8% respectively, with the “No” responses being slightly more 
numerous. Though a significant proportion of respondents to plan to eventually return 
and settle in Bangladesh,  the majority of respondents are either uncommitted or will not 
resettle in Bangladesh. Thus we can reasonably conclude that most of the people in our 
sample are not, at least by plan or intention, temporary migrants. 
 Finally, we also find that an overwhelming majority of participants are remitters 
(93%). Of them, 58.5% send money back to their relatives more that once a year, while 
24.5 send back once a year, so that at least 83% of our sample remits once or more during 
the year. An equal proportion of 7% of respondents cite remitting once every two years, 
while another 7% cite remitting once every five years. Thus, perhaps, even more clearly 
than emotional investment or ties, most of our sample is clearly still economically tied to 
Bangladesh.  
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3.2.4 Philanthropy 
 We asked a set of questions which probed the respondent’s level of involvement 
in Bangladesh, their views on what issues require the most attention in Bangladesh, what 
they’re willing to commit to, what they’ve contributed to thus far, the reasons for their 
involvement, what channels they used to contribute, what obstacles they face in 
contributing to Bangladesh, and finally what improvements they desire in the 
philanthropy efforts towards Bangladesh. We hope that the responses to these questions 
will help us gauge how practically involved the US-Bangladeshi diaspora is currently is, 
and is further willing to be, and what improvements would be most effective in further 
engaging them. 
 We found that 12.1% of the respondents are not involved in any form of groups or 
associations that are tied to their identity as Bangladeshis. A larger proportion  (27.5%) 
however, is involved in professional associations such as those for Bangladeshi doctors, 
dentists, engineers, lawyers, IT specialists, etc. Some (23.1%) are involved in US-based 
Philanthropic/Charity/Advocacy Organization that donates money/support to Bangladesh, 
while some (20.9%) are involved in similar groups that are actually organized and 
operated by members of the Bangladeshi diaspora.  We asked if any or all of the groups 
they were involved in participated in either economic or skills transfers to Bangladesh in 
the past year. Interestingly, the organizations that are US-based and led by non-
Bangladeshis were more cited to have contributed than groups that are run by 
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Bangladeshis. However, this could be a reflection of the fact that more of our respondents 
are members of the former rather than the latter.  
In response to a question on what kinds of initiatives respondents are more likely to 
get involved in over the next few years, a  large majority of cited that they are most likely 
to give money to development/charity/relief projects. The next most common choice was 
the willingness to help set up ties and encourage networking between organizations in 
Bangladesh and USA. This was followed by the option of raising money for a 
charity/development issue by forming a group with other Bangladeshis. Notably, very 
few respondents opted to actually design development or charity projects for Bangladesh, 
and then raise funds for it, while the least chosen option was the option to actively 
advocate for better policies between US government & US businesses and Bangladesh. 
This is an interesting finding, especially as advocacy and lobbying services are a 
prominent and desirable diaspora service discussed earlier in this section as one that 
would especially benefit Bangladesh in light of US-Bangladesh trade and tariff policies. 
From the responses, it seems that the respondents are reluctant to commit to efforts that 
require a lot of active involvement and would prefer instead to offer support to 
established projects. This could be a very meaningful finding for the Bangladeshi 
government, and all other business and non-profit branches interested in soliciting 
diaspora support and investments.  
We also asked respondent to rank what they felt are the five highest priority 
issues/areas of concern in Bangladesh that need to be improved over the next five years. 
Among their responses, accessibility and quality of education ranked highest, 
interestingly infrastructure and construction (e.g. roads, bridges, buildings, etc.) ranked of 
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second-highest importance, followed by health and research related issues in third, 
institutional and bureaucratic reform (e.g. reform of political, educational, public sector 
systems) as fourth, and food and hunger issues as fifth. The welfare of farmers and rural 
industries was also an important issue, followed by issues of gender-rights and social 
inequalities.  Political causes (funding political campaigns, political party and election 
costs, etc.), and religious causes (building of mosques, funding religious education,etc.) 
were listed as least important.  
 
 Dunn (2004) discusses the impact Mexican Hometown Associations (HTAs) in 
the USA have on campaign funding and elections in Mexico in return for extension of 
many political rights given to non-resident Mexicans. Based on these results, it is 
unlikely that the Bangladeshi diaspora has similar political interests, or is as likely to be 
lured into making an investment through the extension of citizenship rights such as 
voting rights and dual citizenship. Furthermore, the respondent’s interest in institutional 
reform is evident in their responses to questions regarding the factors that motivate and 
the factors that prevent them from contributing to development in Bangladesh (discussed 
later). It is also interesting that in response to the previous question, the need for 
institutional reform is deemed to be much more urgent than the issues of food and 
hunger. 
 In a separate question that asks them what issues, they have thus far been 
involved in, we see that education is again at the top of the list, however, other issues, 
such as infrastructure building, that had been cited as urgent, has not been invested in, 
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while issues such as orphan and child care, which were not as highly ranked receive more 
funds. This is most likely due to the lack of avenues available to members of the diaspora 
to invest in infrastructure, whereas funds to support orphans and education are more 
prevalent. By looking at what the diaspora deems as most relevant and urgent,the 
Bangladeshi government can more effectively target and seek financial and professional 
support for its development projects.  
 
It is also interesting that most respondents made their donations indirectly through 
family and friends living in Bangladesh, while a significant amount also donated to US-
based Bangladeshi organizations. The tendency of migrants to use a part of their 
remittances to support causes for the public good has been an interesting issue in diaspora 
philanthropy literature (see Johsnon, 2007; Siddiqui, 2004b). It also has interesting 
implications for governments and organizations regarding what channels most of the 
diaspora aid is most likely to flow through and how to make this more efficient.  
In response to what factors best explain their reason for contributing to Bangladesh, 
most respondents cited reasons that indicate that their primary motivation is the 
betterment of Bangladesh, rather than any social or economic returns gained from these 
investments.  However, interestingly, the primary motivation for contributing couples the 
betterment of Bangladesh with the need to overcome the ineffectiveness of the 
government bureaucracy. For example, the most important reason for making 
contributions was the desire to do positive work in Bangladesh without involving the 
government bureaucracy. This has very interesting implications for what avenues of 
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philanthropy are most likely to attract diaspora support, as it seems non-governmental 
projects would be more attractive than government-led projects. The second most 
important reason was simply the desire to contribute to social, economic and financial 
development of Bangladesh. Other motivations that were also cited are: Due to 
involvement in an organization/group that makes contributions to Bangladesh, due to 
being asked by another person of Bangladeshi-origin to contribute, trust in the 
organization/group they are making their contribution through and also, guilt over the 
difficult conditions in Bangladesh. These responses also indicate that active soliciting by 
groups who are also trustworthy could be effective in attracting support. The least cited 
reasons were the more self-interest driven motives – the opportunity to network with 
other members of the Bangladeshi diaspora (e.g. through professional, cultural, 
philanthropy organizations) and the possibility of recognition by the Bangladeshi 
community either in Bangladesh or USA for their contributions. However, it should be 
considered how likely one is to confess to such motives as one of their primary reasons 
for contributing to their homeland. 
 
The final two questions of the survey focus on the obstacles that prevent immigrants 
from contributing, and what some possible improvements would be. Answers to both of 
these questions seem to indicate a strong sense of distrust among the diaspora in 
development and charity projects in Bangladesh.  
The most important problem diaspora members face regarding making 
contributions to Bangladesh is a lack of trust in the government and general skepticism 
115 
 
about whether there is scope for development in the current political environment. This is 
followed by lack of trust in how their money and/or professional support will be utilized, 
and lack of trust in the efficiency of Bangladeshi-based non-profit and private 
organizations working on the projects.   Some less frequently cited obstacles are  lack of 
information on which projects need spending, and where and how to fund these projects, 
and also,  lack of dispensable income on the part of the respondent. The lease cited 
problems are lack of interest from members of their household and most interestingly, a 
lack of available Bangladeshi networks and organizations in their local area that work on 
charity/relief/advocacy projects in Bangladesh. It seems that the problems is not that 
there are not enough available venues for engagement in philanthropy, but rather that 
members of the diaspora are generally skeptical and distrustful about the effectiveness of 
them, and also in general of the system of how money is handled  in Bangladesh.  
Similarly, the most highly desired improvement that would make contributing to 
Bangladesh more easy and attractive was overwhelmingly the desire for transparency and 
feedback from the organizations about how their money was utilized. This is followed by 
a suggestion that would allow diaspora members to also gain an economic return on their 
investments – e.g. diaspora bonds. Another highly ranked desired improvement is the 
desire for more active involvement by the Bangladeshi government in your local 
communities in the USA to inform non-resident Bangladeshis of what needs to be done in 
Bangladesh.  The least cited desired changes are more relaxed immigration policies 
between the US and Bangladesh and, help from Bangladeshi government agencies with 
job-solicitation and settlement after Bangladeshis move to the USA. Regarding the last 
option, since most respondents have been long-term immigrants with secure jobs, it is 
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unlikely that immigration policies, and help with employment solicitation would be as 
important a factor for them as it would be for more recent and temporary migrants.  
 
 
 
2.3 Conclusion 
We have a sample of highly educated, professional Bangladeshi immigrants, most 
of whom have been here for more than 20years.  One of the goals of this survey was to 
determine the level of social embeddedness of the US- Bangladeshi diaspora. To this end, 
we found that most people visit Bangladesh at least once every five years, a large 
majority of the sample remit at least once a year, and most respondents are also involved 
in some organization that is tied to their identity as Bangladeshis. Though most  
respondents do not  have committed plans to resettle in Bangladesh, most consider 
Bangladesh as playing a large role in their life. Most respondents also reported to making 
a contribution towards Bangladesh. It is significant, however, that most also cited making 
their contributions through family and friends in Bangladesh.   
  
Through this survey we also hoped to get information regarding what kinds of 
projects the members of the diaspora are most interested in supporting, what obstacles 
they face, and what improvements they desire in philanthropy efforts. .It was apparent 
that respondents are more willing to engage in initiatives that have already been 
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established rather than design and propose development projects themselves. We found 
that respondents are mostly interested in education and health  issues, however, 
institutional reform was also a common priority for most, as was infrastructure building. 
While many expressed interest in infrastructure building, a very small number ever 
contributed to it. We hold that this is due to the lack of available avenues to contribute to 
infrastructure building. It is intuitive that the types of opportunities abvailable to the 
diaspora limit what they engage in, despite their interests. Thus it is important to equip 
the diaspora with the ability to contribute to what they feel strongly about, and thus 
organizations and the government must make serious efforts to determine what 
development issues are most important to the diaspora. 
We also found that most of our respondents shared a distrust of the bureaucratic 
system in Bangladesh, and the scope for their money to have any impact. They are also 
very skeptical of the trustworthiness and efficiency of organizations that take donations 
for development projects in Bangladesh. 
  
From this it can be concluded that members of the diaspora are still emotionally 
and economically tied to Bangladesh. They are also interested in being involved in the 
betterment of Bangladesh but have a general lack of trust in the organizations working in 
Bangladesh as well as a lack of trust towards the Bangladeshi government, and prefer to 
donate thorough family and friends. Therefore, in order to engage a diaspora of this 
nature, it is extremely necessary for development projects to have greater transparency. 
We also suggest that greater efforts be made to try to engage families of migrants that 
live in Bangladesh, as it seems that private  remittances are still the primary channel for 
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donating. Greater efforts should also be made to devise ways to integrate philanthropy 
initiatives into the remitting process, such as by having options to donate to public 
projects at money transfer booths. 
 However the diaspora is not a homogenous entity,  thus the results from this 
survey are not comprehensive as the sample represents a very small sector of the 
diaspora. 
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Appendix 
APPENDIX A: Predictions for the Effects of Explanatory Variables on the Receipt of 
Remittances 
 
APPENDIX B: Remittances to Bangladesh 
Top recipients of migrant remittances among developing countries in 2008
 
 
Source: World Bank (Ratha, 2009) 
Destination of Bangladeshi migrants 
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Year-wise and Country-wise remittance flow of wage earners to Bangladesh from Jan 1997 
to Nov 2002 
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Source: extracted from Siddiqui, 2006, Source: Bureau of Manpower, Employment and Training 
(BMET), 2003. 
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AMENITIES AND 
PRESENCE OF 
MIGRANTS 
      own_am~s       dF/dx Std. Err. z P>z x-bar [    95% C.I.   ] 
       migrant*   .1182582 0.046975 2.54 0.011 0.59854 0.02619 0.210327 
logper~e    .1012681 0.030374 3.32 0.001 6.98693 0.041736 0.160801 
famsize    .0431877 0.014519 2.96 0.003 4.6764 0.014732 0.071644 
HH_Inc   -.0715405 0.044696 -1.6 0.11 1.28954 -0.15914 0.016062 
 
AMENITIES AND 
NUMBER OF 
MIGRANTS 
       own_am~s dF/dx Std. Err. z P>z x-bar [    95% C.I.   ] 
        num_migrants 0.070218 0.026543 2.64 0.008 0.861314 0.018195 0.12224 
logper~e 0.101475 0.030461 3.31 0.001 6.98693 0.041772 0.161178 
famsize 0.043321 0.014596 2.95 0.003 4.6764 0.014714 0.071928 
HH_Inc -0.06694 0.044891 -1.49 0.136 1.28954 -0.15492 0.021047 
 
 
LIVESTOCK AND 
PRESENCE OF 
MIGRANTS 
      own_li~k       dF/dx Std. Err. z P>z x-bar [    95% C.I.   ] 
       migrant*   .1083198 0.047162 2.32 0.021 0.59854 0.015885 0.200755 
logper~e   -.0663047 0.031292 -2.11 0.035 6.98693 -0.12764 -0.00497 
famsize    .0565506 0.016067 3.47 0.001 4.6764 0.02506 0.088042 
HH_Inc   -.0050843 0.046498 -0.11 0.913 1.28954 -0.09622 0.086049 
 
 
LIVESTOCK AND 
NUMBER OF 
MIGRANTS 
       own_li~k dF/dx Std. Err. z P>z x-bar [    95% C.I.   ] 
        num_migrants 0.029559 0.025475 1.16 0.246 0.861314 -0.02037 0.079489 
logper~e -0.066 0.031215 -2.11 0.035 6.98693 -0.12718 -0.00482 
famsize 0.057904 0.016054 3.55 0 4.6764 0.026439 0.089369 
HH_Inc -0.00551 0.046484 -0.12 0.906 1.28954 -0.09661 0.085601 
 
 
LAND OWNERSHIP 
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AND MIGRANT 
ownla~19       dF/dx Std. Err. z P>z x-bar [    95% C.I.   ] 
       migrant*   .1722986 0.050434 3.36 0.001 0.6 0.073449 0.271148 
logper~e   -.0209205 0.033609 -0.62 0.534 6.98756 -0.08679 0.044952 
famsize    .0592044 0.016639 3.56 0 4.67317 0.026593 0.091815 
HH_Inc   -.0534037 0.050393 -1.06 0.289 1.29024 -0.15217 0.045364 
 
 
LAND OWNERSHIP 
AND NUMBER OF 
MIGRANTS 
       ownla~19 dF/dx Std. Err. z P>z x-bar [    95% C.I.   ] 
        num_migrants 0.079691 0.028593 2.79 0.005 0.863415 0.02365 0.135732 
logper~e -0.02268 0.033586 -0.68 0.499 6.98756 -0.08851 0.043142 
famsize 0.059347 0.016666 3.56 0 4.67317 0.026683 0.092011 
HH_Inc -0.04807 0.050517 -0.95 0.341 1.29024 -0.14708 0.05094 
 
 
SIZE OF LAND AND 
NUMBER OF 
MIGRANTS 
      
log_lands~19 Coef. Std. Err. t P>t 
[95% 
Conf. Interval] 
       num_migra -0.1186 0.08274 -1.43 0.153 -0.28176 0.044556 
logpercap_~e 0.042628 0.08075 0.53 0.598 -0.11661 0.201864 
famsize 0.197324 0.035367 5.58 0 0.127581 0.267066 
HH_Inc -0.33208 0.136008 -2.44 0.015 -0.60028 -0.06388 
_cons 3.372871 0.60372 5.59 0 2.182361 4.563381 
 
 
 
SIZE OF LAND AND 
PRESENCE OF 
MIGRANTS 
      
       
log_lands~19 Coef. Std. Err. t P>t 
[95% 
Conf. Interval] 
       migrant -0.24722 0.1564 -1.58 0.116 -0.55564 0.061189 
logpercap_~e 0.041213 0.080689 0.51 0.61 -0.1179 0.200327 
famsize 0.194158 0.0351 5.53 0 0.124943 0.263374 
HH_Inc -0.31835 0.135001 -2.36 0.019 -0.58457 -0.05214 
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_cons 3.432489 0.608601 5.64 0 2.232354 4.632624 
 
 
 
APPENDIX D:Effect of household wealth  on Migration 
 
HOUSEHOLD LEVEL: 
PRESENCE OF 
MIGRANTS AND HH 
WEALTH 
      Migrant dF/dx Std. Err. Z P>z x-bar [    95% C.I.   ] 
 
 
      
log_l~19 -.0409718 0.030081 -1.36 0.174 4.11781 
-
0.09993 0.017986 
own_li~k* .0187188 0.08447 0.22 0.823 0.808824 
-
0.14684 0.184276 
logper~e -.0441666 0.036465 -1.21 0.226 6.91383 
-
0.11564 0.027304 
own_am~s*         .0998113 0.084147 1.22 0.223 0.784314 
-
0.06511 0.264736 
 
 
HOUSEHOLD LEVEL: 
NUMBER OF 
MIGRANTS AND HH 
WEALTH 
      
num_migra Coef. Std. Err. t P>t 
[95% 
Conf. Interval] 
       log_lands~19 -0.05528 0.057248 -0.97 0.335 -0.16817 0.057615 
own_livest~k 0.010524 0.159095 0.07 0.947 -0.30321 0.324253 
logpercap_~e -0.09981 0.067266 -1.48 0.139 -0.23246 0.032835 
own_amenit~s 0.253588 0.152944 1.66 0.099 -0.04801 0.555186 
_cons 1.715186 0.558391 3.07 0.002 0.614063 2.816309 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix E Migrant and education of Household 
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PRESENCE OF MIGRANTS AND 
HOUSEHOLD EDUCATION & 
WEALTH 
       migran~d dF/dx Std. Err. Z P>z x-bar [    95% C.I.   ] 
        
edu_high -0.02437 
0.05187
9 -0.47 0.638 
0.23134
3 
-
0.12605 0.07731 
edu_non 
0.03188
7 
0.02555
5 1.25 0.213 1.08955 -0.0182 
0.08197
4 
edu_lit 
0.02281
8 
0.02658
8 0.86 0.391 1.58209 
-
0.02929 
0.07492
9 
logper~e -0.0082 0.03039 -0.27 0.787 6.88107 
-
0.06777 
0.05136
3 
log_l~19 -0.02369 0.02555 -0.93 0.354 4.11493 
-
0.07376 
0.02639
1 
HH_Inc -0.0454 
0.04735
9 -0.96 0.338 1.28358 
-
0.13823 
0.04741
9 
    
Number of obs 
=    268 
   
obs. P 
0.76865
7 
  
                                                       
LR chi2(6)    =   
5.07 
   
pred. P 
0.77227
7 
(at x-
bar) 
 
                                                       
Prob > chi2   = 
0.5351 
    
 
PRESENCE OF MIGRANTS AND HOUSEHOLD EDUCATION & WEALTH at 
HOUSEHOLD LEVEL 
migran~d dF/dx Std. Err. z P>z x-bar [    95% C.I.   ] 
        
edu_high -0.05822 0.068757 -0.85 0.397 0.22549 
-
0.19299 0.076538 
edu_non 0.026711 0.032269 0.83 0.408 1.04902 
-
0.03654 0.089956 
edu_lit 0.019349 0.033493 0.58 0.563 1.59314 -0.0463 0.084993 
logper~e -0.00504 0.039011 -0.13 0.897 6.91383 -0.0815 0.07142 
log_l~19 -0.02601 0.032152 -0.81 0.419 4.11781 
-
0.08903 0.037006 
HH_Inc -0.02367 0.059282 -0.4 0.69 1.30882 
-
0.13986 0.09252 
        obs. P 0.696078 
      pred. P 0.698548 (at x-bar) 
      
 
APPENDIX F: The effect of son_mig without num_son included – column 3, Household 
perspective 
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The effect of son_mig without num_son included – column 3, 
Household perspective 
 
Probit regression, 
reporting 
margina
l effects Number of obs = 500 
 
   
LR chi2(20) = 434.79 
 
   
Prob > chi2 = 0 
 Log likelihood = -125.06914 Pseudo R2 = 0.6348 C.I.   ] 
       edu_no~g     
.016739 0.107613 0.16 0.876 0.132 
-
0.19418 
0.22765
6 
edu_li~g   -
.0396688 0.087596 -0.45 0.651 0.556 
-
0.21136 
0.13201
7 
edu_hi~g   -
.0784244 0.129099 -0.61 0.545 0.09 
-
0.33145 
0.17460
5 
labor_~u    
.6879235 0.296847 2.34 0.019 0.832 
0.10611
4 1.26973 
servic~u    
1.044609 0.345924 3.01 0.003 0.09 
0.36661
1 1.72261 
famsize   -
.0130566 0.021288 -0.61 0.543 4.48 
-
0.05478 
0.02866
7 
num_mi~a   -
.2818589 0.303718 -0.92 0.355 0.932 
-
0.87714 
0.31341
7 
fem_hh    
.0041557 0.025911 0.16 0.873 1.858 
-
0.04663 
0.05493
9 
d_in_law    
.1995111 0.11315 1.72 0.086 0.24 
-
0.02226 
0.42128
2 
grandc~d   -
.0134528 0.082743 -0.16 0.871 0.314 
-
0.17563 
0.14872
1 
edu_non   -
.0261569 0.030307 -0.87 0.387 1.1 
-
0.08556 
0.03324
4 
edu_high   -
.1405532 0.066323 -2.1 0.036 0.134 
-
0.27054 
-
0.01056 
some_c~e*   
.1329394 0.054241 2.1 0.036 0.114 
0.02662
9 0.23925 
high_c~e*   
.4414401 0.05248 4.48 0 0.26 
0.33858
1 
0.54429
9 
visi~2yr    
.0344808 0.074387 0.46 0.643 0.198 
-
0.11131 
0.18027
6 
vis~5_yr    
.1684175 0.18044 0.93 0.351 0.036 
-
0.18524 
0.52207
4 
son_in~a    
.0509772 0.105004 0.48 0.628 0.294 
-
0.15483 
0.25678
1 
bro_in~a    
.0173037 0.065855 0.26 0.793 0.178 
-
0.11177 
0.14637
6 
spouse~a*   
.2661269 0.050161 3.4 0.001 0.1 
0.16781
2 
0.36444
1 
second~a    0.08577 2.32 0.021 0.108 0.02632 0.36253
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.1944301 3 7 
       obs. P        .564 
     pred. P     .783602 (at x-bar) 
      
 
 
 
APPENDIX G: ICDDR,B Baseline Data on Migration Destination for migrants from 
Mirzapur 
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